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NOTES
Employment Discrimination-Defining an Employer's Liability
Under Title VH for On-the-Job Sexual Harassment:
Adoption of a Bifurcated Standard
Sexual harassment has been characterized as the "most widespread prob-
lem women face in the workforce."' Such harassment constitutes a real eco-
nomic barrier to career advancement by women,2 especially in nontraditional
jobs.3 Moreover, it can inflict significant emotional and psychological injury
upon the victim. 4 In response to this growing problem,5 federal courts uni-
formly recognize a cause of action against the employer for sexual harass-
ment 6 under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 7 The courts have failed,
however, to agree on the appropriate standard of employer liability for acts of
harassment by supervisory personnel and instead have employed three distinct
standards.8 One standard imposes strict liability on the employer for all acts
of harassment by a supervisor,9 the second imposes liability only after a show-
1. Sex Discrimination in the Workplace, 1981: Hearings Before the Senate Comm on Labor
and Human Resources, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 518 (1981) (statement of Karen Sauvigne, Program
Director of the Working Women's Institute) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
2. The vast majority of reported sexual harassment cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 involve the harassment of a female employee by a male supervisor or coworker. A
male employee subject to sexual harassment, however, might enjoy the same Title VII protections.
Rasnic, The Evolvement of an Action for Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J.
875, 876 (1982). See diso Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. IU. 1981)
(male employee terminated for refusing advances of homosexual male supervisor has Title VII
claim against employer).
The economic consequences are readily apparent when an employee is fired, demoted, or
denied promotion for refusing the advances of a supervisor. Less-apparent economic loss is
caused by the diminished productivity of the victim. Hearings, supra note I, at 523-24 (statement
of Karen Sauvigne).
3. Almost 75% of working women fill jobs in service-oriented positions historically associ-
ated with female employees. C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DIsCRIMINATION 10 (1979). Such "traditional" jobs include secretarial, teaching,
nursing, and retail sales positions. "Nontraditional" jobs include high status managerial and pro-
fessional positions and blue collar positions in heavy industry, positions historically filled by male
employees. Id. at 10-I1.
4. The psychological and emotional injury occasioned by sexual harassment is manifested
largely in the form of increased stress, but also may include intense "feelings of powerlessness,
fear, anger, nervousness, decreased job satisfaction and diminished ambition." Hearings, supra
note 1, at 524 (statement of Karen Sauvigne).
5. Two commentators estimate that 50 to 80% of all working women have been subject to
some form of on-the-job sexual harassment. See Hill & Behrens, Love in the Office: A Guide for
Dealing with Sexual Harassment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 30 DEPAUL L.
REv. 581, 581-82 (1981) (citing a comprehensive review of recent surveys of D. NEUGARTEN & J.
SHAFRaTy, SEXUALITY 1N ORGANIZATIONS (1980)).
6. See, eg., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (1lth Cir. 1982); Miller v. Bank of
Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d
Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc.,
552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
8. C. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 58.
9. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
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ing that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment
and failed to remedy the situation;10 the third, recently adopted by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, is a bifurcated standard that imposes strict liability
for forms of harassment involving some official action by the supervisor, but
uses the knowledge standard when official action is lacking.II This note ana-
lyzes each standard and concludes that the bifurcated standard offers the most
realistic and effective means to combat on-the-job sexual harassment.
Sexual harassment is "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in
the context of a relationship of unequal power."' 2 In an employment situa-
tion, it concerns an unwelcome and offensive advance, statement, or other ac-
tion of a sexual nature that interferes with an employee's ability to perform a
job and pursue a career.13
The cases and commentary have devoted little discussion to establishing
criteria for defining acts that constitute actionable sexual harassment, largely
because the litigated incidents involve only the most blatant harassment. 14
Moreover, because of the subjective analysis of harassment employed by the
courts,15 future cases necessarily will remain fact sensitive and are unlikely to
provide any concrete definitions. 16 One commentator, however, has presented
ten elements to consider in determining whether particular behavior is unlaw-
ful sexual harassment: the severity of the conduct; the number and frequency
of the encounters; the relationship between the parties; any provocation by the
victim; the response of the victim to the conduct; the apparent reaction of the
victim; the general working environment; the location of the conduct (in a
public or private place); and the male-female ratio in the workplace. 17
However defined, sexual harassment now is recognized as a form of sex
10. See Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
11. See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897
(llth Cir. 1982).
12. C. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 1.
13. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission defined "sexual harassment" as:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as
the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1983). This definition has been criticized as too broad to provide any
effective guidance to employers dealing with alleged acts of sexual harassment. See Linenberger,
What Behavior Constitutes Sexual Harassment?, 34 LAB. L.J. 238, 242-43 (1983).
14. Linenberger, supra note 13, at 238.
15. An act is deemed offensive based on the subjective perceptions of the victim, if reason-
able, rather than on any objective standard. See Linenberger, supra note 13, at 242; Comment,
Sexual Harassment and Title VII-Female Employees' Claim Alleging Verbal and Physlcal Ad-
vances by a Male Supervisor Dismissed as Nonactionable-Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 51
N.Y.U. L. REv. 148, 162 (1976).
16. Linenberger, supra note 13, at 238.
17. Id. at 246-47.
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discrimination prohibited by Title VII.L 8 Title VII does not contain an express
provision concerning sexual harassment, and its prohibition of sex discrimina-
tion was added by Congress, with little debate,' 9 just prior to enactment.20
Without legislative history for guidance, federal courts initially disagreed
whether Title VII provided a cause of action for on-the-job sexual harassment.
The first case considering the issue, Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. ,21 con-
cluded that sexual harassment was a mere "personal proclivity, peculiarity or
mannerism"2 2 of the supervisor and did not create liability for the employer
under Title VII. Until 1977, this analysis prevailed in the district courts.23
Prior to 1977, only one district court had ruled that sexual harassment was
actionable under Title VII. In Williams v. Saxbe24 the District Court for the
District of Columbia considered the Title VII claim of a female employee dis-
charged from the Justice Department 25 for refusing to submit to the advances
of her supervisor. The court ruled that sexual harassment is "an artificial bar-
18. Section 703(a) of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
19. The prohibition against sex discrimination was added by a floor amendment submitted
by Rep. Smith on February 8, 1964. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964). Rep. Smith was an opponent
of Title VII and his amendment was considered an attempt to confuse the purpose of Title VII as
a means to defeat the bill. See id at 2581 (remarks of Rep. Green). The House of Representatives
adopted the amendment without a hearing and with little debate. Id. at 2582, 2804.
20. Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (1964).
21. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacatedmen, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
22. Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163.
23. See, e.g., Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976),
rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976),
rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
24. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'dsub nor. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir.
1978). The reversal was on the procedural grounds that the district court considered only the
administrative record in reaching a judgment, rather than conducting a new trial as mandated by
Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976).
25. Although federal employees initially were excluded from Title VII, coverage was pro-
vided by a 1972 amendment:
(a) All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment (except with
regard to aliens employed outside the limits of the United States) in military depart-
ments,. . . in executive agencies,. . . in the United States Postal Service and the Postal
Rate Commission, in those units of the Government of the District of Columbia having
positions in the competitive service, and in those units of the legislative and judicial
branches of the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service, and in
the Library of Congress shall be made free from any discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11(a), 86 Stat. 111 (1972)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). This amendment provides private
and federal employees with identical Title VII protection. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 988
(D.C. Cir. 1977) ("It is beyond cavil that Congress legislated for federal employees essentially the
same guarantees against sex discrimination that previously it had afforded private employees.").
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rier to employment which was placed before one gender and not the other. '26
This barrier qualified as a condition of employment and, because imposed
only on one gender, violated Title VII.27
Three federal courts of appeals adopted the Williams analysis in 1977.
Each of the cases, Barnes v. Costle,28 Tompkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas
Co. ,29 and Garber v. Saxon Business Products, Inc. ,30 involved a female em-
ployee fired for refusing her supervisor's sexual advances. In each case the
courts found that submission to sexual advances was a condition of employ-
ment imposed on the employee because of her sex. Title VII clearly prohibits
such a condition. Since 1977, two more courts of appeals have recognized this
cause of action: the Ninth Circuit in Miller v. Bank ofAmerica 3' and the Elev-
enth Circuit in Henson v. City of Dundee.32 No circuit has refused to recognize
the cause of action.33
The Henson court clearly enumerated the elements of a Title VII sexual
harassment claim. To establish a claim, plaintiff must show: (1) "[t]he em-
ployee belongs to a protected group"; 34 (2) "the employee was subject to un-
welcome sexual harassment";35 (3) "[t]he harassment complained of was based
upon sex"; 36 (4) "[t]he harassment complained'of affected a term, condition, or
privilege of employment"; 37 and (5) a basis to impose liability on the employer
under some theory of respondeat superior.38 The federal courts are in full
agreement on the first four elements of the claim. It is on the fifth that the
courts disagree; three different standards of respondeat superior are currently
in use. Such a conflict prevents uniform and effective enforcement of Title VII
against on-the-job sexual harassment and must be resolved.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit imposed the most rigid stan-
dard of employer liability: strict liability for all acts of harassment by a super-
visor. In Miller v. Bank ofAmerica39 a female employee claimed that she had
been fired for refusing the sexual demands of her male supervisor.40 The bank
had a long-standing policy against sexual harassment and an effective griev-
ance procedure for reporting violations of this policy. Because the employee
26. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 657-58.
27. Id. at 659, 661.
28. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
29. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
30. 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
31. 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
32. 682 F.2d 897 (1lth Cir. 1982).
33. In Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1979), plaintiff alleged a Title VII sexual harass-
ment claim. Plaintiff claimed she was fired from her college teaching position because she had
refused the romantic advances of her department chairman. The court dismissed the claim be-
cause of pleading defects in the complaint.
34. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 904.
38. Id. at 905.
39. 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
40. Id. at 212.
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failed to use this grievence procedure, the bank argued that she had waived
any claims she might have had.4 1 The court of appeals reversed the district
court's dismissal42 of the employee's Title VII claim, ruling that Title VII pro-
vides a cause of action to the employee. The court then established its stan-
dard of employer liability for sexual harassment:
We conclude that respondeat superior does apply here, where the
action complained of was that of a supervisor, authorized to hire,
fire, discipline and promote, or at least to participate in or recom-
mend such actions, even though what the supervisor is said to have
done violates company policy. 43
Thus, the bank was liable for the supervisor's harassing behavior even though
it arguably did not have any knowledge of the behavior.44
To date, the Miller rule has not been explicitly adopted by any other
court. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), however,
did adopt strict liability in its 1980 guidelines on sexual harassment, ruling that
an employer is liable "for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory em-
ployees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific
acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and
regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of their occur-
rence." 45 These guidelines carry no legal authority; they are merely advi-
sory.46 They do, however, represent the official opinion of the agency charged
with enforcing Title V1147 and can significantly influence the courts. 48
The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) has at-
tempted to incorporate the EEOC guidelines and the EEOC's strict liability
41. Id. at 213.
42. Miller, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'g 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
43. Miller, 600 F.2d at 213.
44. While the opinion in Miller does not mention whether plaintiffs failure to use the bank's
grievance procedure left the bank unaware of the supervisor's behavior, subsequent cases have
assumed that the bank was unaware of this conduct. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993
n.72 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("official policy of bank to discourage sexual conduct, and bank not advised
of behavior by filing of grievance with Employee Relations Department").
45. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1983).
46. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1976).
48. The Supreme Court has observed that the EEOC employment guidelines generally are
"entitled to great deference" by the courts. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34
(1971). The guidelines, however, are "not entitled to great weight" when they reflect a new policy
unsupported by legislative history or prior judicial construction. Trans World Airlines v. Hardi-
son, 432 U.S. 63, 76 n.l1 (1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-43 (1976).
The guidelines on sexual harassment have received mixed reviews from commentators.
Those advocating the strict liability theory strongly support the guidelines. See Attanasio, Equal
Justice Under Chaos: The Developing Law of Sexual Harassment, 51 U. CIN. L. Rav. 1 (1982);
Comment, New EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Employer Liabilityfor Sexual
Harassment Under Title VII, 61 B.U.L. Rav. 535 (1981); Note, Sexual Harassment ofEmployees
Creates Discriminatory Work Environment in Violation of Title VII, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1385
(1981). Other commentators have found the guidelines overly broad and unsupported by judicial
precedent. See Bryan, Sexual Harassment as Unlawful Discrimination Under Title VII ofthe Civil
RightsAct o/'1964, 14 LoY. L.A.L. Rv. 25, 55 (1981); Linenberger, supra note 13, at 242-43;
McLain, The EEOC Sexual Harassment Guidelines: Welcome Advances Under Title VII?, 10 U.
BALT. L. Rav. 275, 322-24 (1981).
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theory into its own regulations governing federal contracts. 49 These regula-
tions would impose contractual obligations to prevent and remedy sexual har-
assment on all businesses holding federal contracts or working on federally
funded construction sites.50 The implementation of these regulations, how-
ever, was suspended in 1981 pending further action.51
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit apparently has
adopted the strict liability theory as well, although in a modified form. In
Barnes v. Costle52 the court recognized a cause of action against the Environ-
mental Protection Agency under Title VII for discharging an employee who
refused the sexual advances of her supervisor. The court observed that in sex-
ual harassment cases "an employer is chargeable with Title VII violations oc-
casioned by discriminatory practices of supervisory personnel. 5-3 The court
recognized, however, that the employer may be relieved of liability if the su-
pervisor acted contrary to the employer's policies and without the employer's
knowledge and the "consequences are rectified when discovered."'54 The bur-
den of proof is on the employer to establish these grounds for relief from
liability.55
The District of Columbia Circuit rule, however, still may be in a state of
flux. A recent district court opinion rejected strict liability and adopted the
knowledge standard for sexual harassment claims.56 This court found for the
employer because it lacked knowledge of the alleged harassment. 57
The proponents of the strict liability theory have advanced three argu-
ments in its favor. The strongest is that the language of Title VII itself man-
dates strict liability.58 Title VII prohibits sex discrimination, which includes
sexual harassment, by any "employer." 59 Title VII defines the term "em-
ployer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce... and any
49. 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.8 (1981). These regulations were suspended indefinitely in 1981 by the
Reagan administration. 46 Fed. Reg. 42,865 (1981).
50. 45 Fed. Reg. 86,249 (1980).
51. See supra note 49.
52. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
53. Id. at 993.
54. Id.
55. Id. The Barnes standard was repeated in Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir.
1981). See infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
56. Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1980). In Pinson an
employee of a savings and loan association charged her employer with violating Title VII by
requiring her to submit to her branch manager's sexual demands and by firing her after she re-
fused to continue meeting these demands. The court ruled for the employer because the employee
had never reported the alleged sexual demands to senior management and the employer demon-
strated a nondiscriminatory reason for firing the employee, her excessive sick leave. Vinson is in
accord with most federal district court opinions on sexual harassment, see infra notes 80-82 and
accompanying text.
57. Vinson, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 41.
58. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979); Attanasio, supra note 48, at
32 ("The plain language of the Act imposes liability for discrimination by any agent."); Hill &
Behrens, supra note 5, at 613 ("Title VII includes in its definition of 'employer' any agent of one
who otherwise qualifies as a defendant.").
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
[Vol. 62
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
agent of such aperson."60 Because a supervisor is the agent of his employer,
his discriminatory acts are covered by Title VII.
Second, as courts consistently have applied strict liability to employers for
a supervisor's acts of racial, ethnic, and religious harassment, 61 some courts
and commentators reason that this standard similarly should apply to a super-
visor's acts of sexual harassment.62 Sex discrimination is prohibited in the
same section of Title VII as these other forms of discrimination and Congress
has indicated that it should be combatted with equal vigor.63 To give effect to
congressional intent, it is argued that the same standard of liability should
apply to sexual harassment as is applied to racial, ethnic, or religious
harassment.
Unfortunately, the cases considering racial, ethnic, or religious harass-
ment have devoted little discussion to the policy rationale for imposing strict
liability.6 Nonetheless, proponents argue that strict liability would create
uniformity under Title VII and provide employees with the same protection
against sexual harassment as is provided against other forms of harassment.
The final argument for strict liability is that it would provide the victim of
sexual harassment with maximum legal protection. Strict liability is consid-
ered essential to ensure that employers do not ignore the problem by hiding
behind their ignorance of particular incidents.65 Moreover, the employer con-
trols the general employment situation and the particular supervisor; there-
fore, the employer is in the best position to prevent the occurrence of
harassment. 66 Strict liability is deemed an essential incentive to compel em-
ployers to prevent such harassment.
Strict liability also is considered fair to the employer since it imposes no
undue burden. Even if totally unaware of the harassment, the employer is
unlikely to suffer an adverse judgment if it acts promptly to remedy the situa-
60. Id. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added).
61. See, e.g., Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found., 578 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1978) (racial harassment);
Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977) (ethnic harass-
ment); Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975) (religious harass-
ment); Lucero v. Beth Isr. Hosp. & Geriatric Center, 479 F. Supp. 452 (D. Colo. 1979) (racial
harassment); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (religious harassment).
62. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Hearings, supra note 1, at
350-51 (statement of J. Clay Smith, Jr., Acting EEOC Chairman); C. MACKJNNON, supra note 3,
at 93-94; Bryan, supra note 48, at 45-47.
63. "Discrimination against women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited discrimi-
natory practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to any type of
unlawful discrimination." H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONO. & AD. NEws 2137, 2141.
64. One court concluded that the statutory language of Title VII required strict liability for
racially motivated harassment of white hospital employees by their black supervisor, see Lucero v.
Beth Isr. Hosp. & Geriatric Center, 479 F. Supp. 453, 455 (D. Colo. 1979) (citing Miller v. Bank of
Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979)). Another court adopted strict liability on policy grounds.
See Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976). In Compston an employer was
held strictly liable for the antisemitic comments of a supervisor: "When a person vested with
managerial responsibilities embarks upon a course of conduct calculated to demean an employee
before his fellows because of the employee's professed religious views, such activity will necessar-
ily have the effect of altering the conditions of his employment." Id. at 160-61.
65. C. MACKiNNON, supra note 3, at 211.
66. Id. at 93.
1984]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tion because the EEOC has stated that it will not pursue a case if the employer
provides a suitable remedy on its own initiative.67 The employee may be will-
ing to accept the remedial action as a settlement and abandon his or her indi-
vidual case.68 Should the case go to trial, the employer may obtain a dismissal
due to mootness, as the relief sought already had been provided, or suffer only
a nominal judgment because it had mitigated the employee's damages. 69
Furthermore, the strict liability standard will not subject the employer to
Title VII liability for every ill-timed pass or flirtation by a supervisor, as some
courts have claimed.70 Such behavior is purely personal to the supervisor and
is beyond the coverage of Title VII.71 The employer is liable under Title VII
only when the supervisor uses "his power as a supervisor to affect the
subordinate's employment status in an effort to obtain compliance with his
sexual advance," 72 or when his behavior is sufficiently offensive and pervasive
to constitute an offensive work environment. 73 Until the behavior reaches one
of these levels, Title VII liability cannot exist.
The second standard for employer liability, the actual or constructive
knowledge standard, was promulgated in Tompkins v. Public Service Electric &
Gas Co. ,74 one of the first appellate court decisions considering sexual harass-
ment. The supervisor in Tompkins informed a female employee during a job
performance review session that she must accede to his sexual demands if they
were to maintain a "satisfactory working relationship." 75 The employee re-
ported these demands to senior management and requested a transfer to an-
other department. After promising her a transfer to a similar job,
management personnel assigned her to an inferior position and later fired
her.76
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in reversing the dismissal of
the employee's complaint by the district court,77 established the actual or con-
structive knowledge test:
[W]e conclude that Title VII is violated when a supervisor, with the
actual or constructive knowledge of the employer, makes sexual ad-
67. This means where an employer knows of acts of sexual harassment which have been
committed by a supervisor or an agent and rectifies the actual results of those actions, a
further remedy under Title VII would be unlikely in the administrative process. Clearly,
the Commission would not sue for a remedy which has already been granted.
Hearings, supra note I, at 351 (statement of J. Clay Smith, Jr., Acting EEOC Chairman).
68. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1979).
69. Attanasio, supra note 48, at 34-36.
70. See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) ("[A]n
outgrowth of holding such activity to be actionable under Title VII would be a potential federal
lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances toward another."),
vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
71. Bryan, supra note 48, at 46-47.
72. Id. at 47.
73. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
74. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
75. Id. at 1045.
76. Id. at 1046.
77. Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas. Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977), rep , 422 F.
Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976).
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vances or demands toward a subordinate employee and conditions
that employee's job status--evaluation, continued employment, pro-
motion, or other aspects of career development--on a favorable re-
sponse to those advances or demands, and the employer does not
take prompt and appropriate remedial action after acquiring such
knowledge.78
The employer acquires actual knowledge when management personnel are in-
formed of the harassment through employee complaints or other forms of in-
tra-office communication. Participation by management in the harassment
itself also may create actual knowledge. Constructive knowledge will be in-
ferred if the harassment is so open and pervasive that the employer can be
presumed to know of it.79
The knowledge standard has been favored by most district courts consid-
ering sexual harassment cases.80 In Meyers v. I TT .Diverspfed Credit Corp. ,81
for example, a Missouri federal district court concluded that "in order to im-
pose liability on an employer for the discriminatory acts of its supervisor, the
plaintiff must make the additional showing that the employer had actual or
constructive knowledge of the discriminatory acts of its supervisor and did
nothing to rectify the situation."82
The knowledge standard of liability is unique to sexual harassment cases;
all other forms of Title VII discrimination by supervisory personnel have been
adjudicated under the strict liability theory.83 Proponents of the knowledge
standard argue that sexual harassment is a unique form of discrimination and,
therefore, is entitled to its own standard of liability.
The arguments favoring the knowledge standard, based largely on policy
considerations, are articulated clearly in Judge MacKinnon's concurring opin-
ion in Barnes v. Costle. 84 Although Judge MacKinnon agreed that the Barnes
employer should be held liable, he rejected the majority's views on strict lia-
bility8" and presented his analysis favoring the knowledge standard. Judge
MacKinnon asserted that strict liability has been applied to Title VII cases for
three reasons: (1) the employer is in the best position to explain the discrimina-
tory behavior; (2) the employer, as master of the workplace, is in the best posi-
tion to control and eliminate the discrimination; and (3) "the type of conduct
78. Tompkins, 568 F.2d at 1048-49 (emphasis added).
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Meyers v. I.T.T. Diversified Credit Corp., 527 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (E.D. Mo.
1981); Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1980); Ludington v.
Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Wisc. 1979); Neidhardt v. D.H. Holmes Co., 21
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 452, 468 (E.D. La. 1979); Heelan v. Johns-Manville, Inc., 451 F.
Supp. 1382, 1389 (D. Colo. 1978); Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 466 (E.D.
Mich. 1977).
81. 527 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (employer liable under Title VII for firing employee
who had complained of supervisory sexual harassment and for failing to investigate those
complaints).
82. Id. at 1068.
83. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
84. 561 F.2d 983, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
85. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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at issue is questionable at best, and it is not undesirable to induce careful em-
ployers to err on the side of avoiding possible violative conduct."86 He then
argued that none of these rationales apply in the sexual harassment situation.
First, the employer is not in a position to know of, much less explain,
cases of sexual harassment. Such harassment is "seldom a public matter"87
and easily can occur outside the work place.88 Sexual harassment, because of
its private nature, does not have to be performed publicly to be effective.
Moreover, certain forms of sexual harassment, such as sexual advances, are
more effective when performed privately. As such, it is the employee, rather
than the employer, who is most able to detect, report, and explain acts of sex-
ual harassment. While racial, ethnic, and religious harassment also can be
performed privately, they generally are more humiliating to the victim when
performed publicly.
For similar reasons, the employer is often in no position to control the
harassment as it occurs.89 Again, most harassment occurs privately and, as
such, is difficult to monitor and control. Judge MacKinnon did note that the
employer can act to control harassment to some degree by voicing a strong
policy against harassment, providing an effective and anonymous grievance
procedure for reporting violations of this policy, and acting promptly to disci-
pline the offending supervisor upon receipt of a valid complaint.90 Even with
such a procedure, however, the first step of reporting the harassment remains
with the employee.
Finally, Judge MacKinnon argued that sexual harassment, unlike other
forms of harassment, does not involve behavior that is "intrinsically offen-
sive." 91 While all racial, ethnic, and religious harassment is offensive, all sex-
ual advances are not. In cases of sexual advances, "it is the abuse of the
practice, rather than the practice itself," that creates grounds for objection and
forms the basis for a Title VII claim. 92
For these reasons, Judge MacKinnon concluded that sexual harassment
should be treated differently than other forms of discrimination under Title
VII and is entitled to a distinct standard of liability. He considered the knowl-
edge standard to be the fairest to the employer and to the employee. The em-
ployer is not liable for conduct of which it is unaware and over which it can
exert little prior control.93 Once informed, it can act promptly to rectify the
86. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 998 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 999 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
88. This was the case in Tompkins; the supervisor made his demands while talking to the
employee in a restaurant. Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir.
1977).
89. See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 1000 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 1000-01 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 1001 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
92. Id. (MacKinnon, J., concurring). The EEOC has echoed this position: "[Tihe same ac-
tions which, under one set of circumstances, would constitute sexual harassment, might under
another set of circumstances, constitute acceptable social behavior." Hearings, supra note 1, at
348-49 (statement of J. Clay Smith, Jr., Acting Director of the EEOC).
93. See Conte & Gregory, Sexual Harassment in Employment-Some Proposals Toward More
Realistic Standards of Liability, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 402, 411 n.18 (1982-83).
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employee's injury and avoid liability. If it fails to act in this manner, liability
will be imposed. No undue burden is placed on the employee, who can easily
notify the employer of the harassment through a grievance procedure or any
other form of communication to management.94
One commentator has suggested that this standard will combat sexual
harassment more effectively than the strict liability standard.95 The knowl-
edge standard provides the employer with a real incentive to rectify acts of
harassment immediately after notification to avoid subsequent liability. Under
the strict liability standard, liability is imposed when the harassing act occurs;
subsequent remedial action by the employer will not extinguish this liability.
Hence, the employer lacks the incentive to provide a remedy on its own initia-
tive. Moreover, the employer actually may be reluctant, even unwilling, to
remedy the harassment because this might be viewed as an admission of guilt
in subsequent litigation.96 By this analysis, the knowledge standard, not the
strict liability standard, provides the more effective tool to combat harassment.
These arguments in favor of the knowledge standard, however, are based
on policy considerations alone and largely ignore the language of Title VII.
Nonetheless, such an approach may be justifiable because of the limited legis-
lative history on sex discrimination in general and the absence of legislative
history on sexual harassment.97 Because the courts, not Congress, recognized
sexual harassment as actionable under Title VII, the courts have claimed the
right to define the parameters of that cause of action.
The bifurcated standard of liability recognizes that sexual harassment ex-
ists in two forms. The early sexual harassment cases concerned only quidpro
quo harassment in which the supervisor demanded sexual favors in exchange
for continued employment and advancement. Recently, however, courts have
recognized that a supervisor can perform harassment without demanding a
quidpro quo from the employee. For example, the supervisor could make
repeated derogatory or suggestive comments about the employee's sex or sexu-
ality, which creates an offensive work environment for the employee.9 8 This
type of harassment was recognized as a distinct form of prohibited sexual har-
assment inBundy v. Jackson. 99 InBundy plaintiff was never fired, demoted, or
denied promotion by the employer for refusing her superviso:r's repeated sex-
ual demands; she still was fully employed when suit was brought.1 00 Never-
theless, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that
94. Id. at 412 n.18.
95. See Bryan, supra note 48, at 52.
96. Id. See also Hearings, supra note 1, at 568-72 (statement of Kenneth MeCulloch, attor-
ney, Townley & Updike) (knowledge standard encourages resolution of harassment through inter-
nal grievance procedures rather than through costly litigation).
97. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
98. This concept ofquidpro quo and hostile work environment harassment was first articu-
lated by Catherine MacKinnon. MacKinnon strongly supported the strict liability theory for all
acts of sexual harassment by a supervisor and argued that the two forms of harassment should not
be subject to separate theories of liability. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 211, 237.
99. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
100. Id. at 940-41.
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sexual harassment as a regular condition of the plaintiff's employment violated
Title VII.101 The court remanded the case for determination of appropriate
injunctive relief.102
The post-Bundy courts of appeals decisions on sexual harassment have
recognized the distinction between quidpro quo and offensive work environ-
ment harassment and have adopted separate standards of employer liability
for each. In the first of these cases, Henson v. City of Dundee,10 3 the employee,
a female radio dispatcher for a municipal police department, alleged that she
had been subjected to repeated sexual demands by the chief of police and also
had been denied admission to the police academy by the chief for refusing
these demands.' 04
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, relying on Bundy, found
that the repeated sexual advances had created an offensive work environment
in violation of Title VII.105 The court held that the actual or constructive
knowledge standard of employer liability applied to this type of harassment:
"Where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to hold the employer responsible for the
hostile work environment created by the plaintiffs supervisor or coworker, she
must show that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in
question and failed to take prompt remedial action."' 06
After resolving the offensive work environment claim, the court addressed
the second charge. The court found that Henson had been barred from at-
tending the police academy by the police chief for refusing his sexual demands
and that this action was quidpro quo harassment.'0 7 The City was held
strictly liable for this form of harassment: "We hold that an employer is
strictly liable for the actions of its supervisors that amount to sexual harass-
ment resulting in tangible job detriment to the subordinate employee."'108
To justify this bifurcated standard, the court analyzed the differences be-
tween the two forms of harassment. The supervisor does not use his authority
as supervisor to create an offensive work environment. His actions are identi-
cal to those of a coworker and should be subject to the same standard of em-
ployer liability used in coworker harassment cases, the actual or constructive
knowledge standard. 0 9
101. Id. at 943-44. The Bundy court relied heavily upon Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972), which held that an employer violated Title VII by
creating a racially discriminatory work atmosphere which caused psychological, but not economic,
injury to the employee. Bundy has been much praised by commentators. See Note, Expanding
Title VII to Prohibit a Sexualy Harassing Work Environment, 70 GEo. L.J. 345 (1981); Note,
Eliminating the Need to Prove Tangible Economic Job Loss in Sexual Harassment Claims Brought
Under Title VII, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 907 (1982); Note, supra note 48.
102. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 950.
103. 682 F.2d 897 (1th Cir. 1982).
104. Id. at 899-900.
105. Id. at 902.
106. Id. at 905.
107. Id. at 911-12.
108. Id. at 910.
109. Id. Federal courts are in agreement that the knowledge standard applies in cases in
which an employee is sexually harassed by a coworker. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th
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When the supervisor conditions continued employment and promotion
on submission to sexual demands, however, he is acting in an official capac-
ity.110 Because the employer clothed the supervisor with the authority to
make quidpro quo harassment possible, the employer is strictly liable for
abuses of that authority. As the court noted, "Because the supervisor is acting
within at least the apparent scope of the authority entrusted to him by the
employer when he makes employment decisions, his conduct can fairly be im-
puted to the source of his authority."" I
This bifurcated standard was recently adopted by the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in Katz v. Dole. 112 Katz was an air traffic controller for
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The only female employee on
her particular work shift, Katz was subjected to continual sexual harassment
by her coworkers and her supervisor." 3 She complained about the harass-
ment to the supervisior, but his response was further harassment.'14 Her com-
plaints to higher level management were ignored. 1 5 She requested a transfer
to another shift, but was informed by the supervisor of that shift that the trans-
fer could be arranged only in exchange for sexual favors. 116 Katz was fired in
1981 for participating in the air traffic controllers strike against the FAA.117
The Katz court, reversing the district court, held that an offensive work
environment existed in the FAA control room." 8 Relying on Henson, the
court treated the offensive conduct by Katz's coworkers and supervisor under
the knowledge standard of liability: "We believe that in a 'condition of work
case' the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer had actual or construc-
tive knowledge of the existence of a sexually hostile working environment and
took no prompt and adequate remedial action.'119
Again relying on Henson, the court also held that "[w]here the plaintiff's
complaint is of quid pro quo harassment by supervisory personnel, the em-
Cir. 1983); Kyriaza v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978), aId, 647 F.2d 388 (3d
Cir. 1981); Smith v. Rust Eng'g Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1172 (N.D. Ala. 1978). This
standard is also used to determine employer liability for coworkers' acts of racial and ethnic har-
assment. See, e.g., DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796 (1st Cir. 1980); Friend v. Leidinger, 588
F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978).
110. Henson, 682 F.2d at 910.
111. Id.
112. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983). Three federal district courts also have adopted the Henson
standard. See Cummings v. Walsh Const. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (complaint
stated cause of action under Henson by alleging employer was aware of an offensive work envi-
ronment but failed to provide a remedy); Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 560 F.
Supp. 1172 (D. Del. 1983) (company not liable, under both Henson and Tomkins, for an offensive
work environment created by a supervisor because senior management promptly investigated and
ended the harassment); Conley v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(court expressly adopted Henson and rejected the EEOC guidelines in finding an employer liable
for failing to correct offensive work environment after receiving notice).
113. Katz, 709 F.2d at 253.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 255 n.6.
117. Id. at 253.
118. Id. at 256.
119. Id. at 255.
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ployer is strictly liable."' 20 The court found that Katz had stated a claim for
quidpro quo harassment by alleging that a supervisor had demanded sexual
favors in exchange for a transfer to his shift. The court declined to adjudicate
this claim, however, because Katz had stated a sufficient claim for condition of
work harassment and would prevail on that claim. 12 1
Katz is the most recent addition to the appellate case law concerning an
employer's Title VII liability for on-the-job sexual harassment. The court
adopted the Henson bifurcated standard, but did not present any arguments
for doing so. The court simply articulated the standard and cited Henson and
Bundy as authority.122 It did not discuss the different standards adopted in
Miller and Tompkins, nor were these cases cited in the opinion. The Katz
court viewed Henson as the correct trend in Title VII sexual harassment cases
and perceived no need to consider the two older standards.123
The underlying assumptions of the bifurcated standard are that supervi-
sory harassment exists in two distinct forms, quidpro quo harassment and of-
fensive work condition harassment, and that the fairest and most effective
standard of liability must be assigned to each form, even at the expense of
uniformity.' 24 This distinction between these two forms must be valid for the
bifurcated standard to have merit.
A careful analysis of the two types of sexual harassment reveals that this
distinction between quidpro quo and offensive work environment harassment
is justified. In quidpro quo harassment the supervisor is using his authority as
supervisor to secure submission to his demands. 125 Without this express use of
authority, the quidpro quo would be meaningless. A nonsupervisory em-
ployee would be unable to effect harassment of this type because he lacks the
supervisor's ability to retaliate if his demands are not met. In contrast, a non-
supervisory employee is fully capable of creating an offensive work environ-
ment. In this type of harassment, the ability to harass is a function of the
proximity of the victim to the harasser. 126 Supervisory authority plays no role;
the supervisor and the coworker are equally capable of effecting such
harassment.
It has been argued that the employee-victim may feel compelled to toler-
ate an offensive work environment created by a supervisor to a greater extent
than one imposed by a coworker.' 2 7 The employee may decline to complain
about the offensive behavior, either to the supervisor directly or to higher
management, because of intimidation or fear of reprisal by the supervisor. If
so, the supervisor may be more successful with offensive work environment
120. Id. at 255 n.6.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 255.
123. Id.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
125. E.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (1Ith Cir. 1982).
126. E.g.,id. at 905.
127. Comment, supra note 48, at 544.
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harassment than a coworker could. 128 The supervisor, however, is creating the
hostile environment without express use of his power as supervisor. His ability
to harass still depends on his proximity to the victim, rather than on his status
in the work place. Furthermore, if the supervisor actually threatens reprisal,
the situation is no longer limited to an offensive work environment, but has
evolved into quidpro quo harassment. 129 An offensive work environment, by
itself, lacks the threatened use of authority and offical action found in quidpro
quo harassment.
This basic difference between the two forms of harassment warrants ana-
lyzing each form separately to determine the appropriate standards of liability.
Such analysis establishes that, for policy reasons, quidpro quo harassment jus-
tifies imposing strict liability, while offensive work environment harassment
should be subject to the knowledge standard.
The first policy rationale relates to the nature of the threat posed by each
type of harassment. Quid pro quo harassment confronts the victim with the
more serious threat: the risk of employment sanctions, such as termination,
demotion, or denial of promotion. This immediate threat is absent in an of-
fensive work environment; although such an environment is certainly unpleas-
ant, the employee's employment continues uninterrupted and unthreatened.
130
Because quidpro quo harassment poses a more serious threat, the victim needs
the stronger protection of strict liability.
Strict liability for quidpro quo harassment is further justified because the
employer creates the supervisory authority that makes such harassment possi-
ble. Quidpro quo harassment involves an official act by the supervisor when
deciding to fire, demote, or deny promotion to the victim. The employer
vested the supervisor with the authority to perform this official act and, conse-
quently, should be liable for misuse of that authority.13
1
Finally, strict liability would help prevent acts of quidpro quo harassment
from occurring. Because the authority to effect quid pro quo harassment is
derived from the employer, the employer is also in a stronger position to pre-
vent such harassment by prudent regulation of that authority. The employer
can detect and correct any retaliatory employment decision made by a super-
visor as part of a quidpro quo harassment scheme by requiring documentation
of the supervisor's rationale and by subjecting the decision to review by
higher-level management. Strict liability would give the employee the requi-
site incentive to create these safeguards. Faced with the imposition of liability
128. Id.
129. See, ag., Cummings v. Walsh Const. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 878-79 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (su-
pervisor created a quidpro quo by retaliating against an employee who reported to higher man-
agement supervisor's sexual advances). See also Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568
F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d Cir. 1977).
130. InBundy, for example, the employee still was fully employed at the time she brought suit.
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
131. Under traditional agency law, a master is liable for the unauthorized torts of the servant
when the agency relationship assists the servant in the commission of the tort. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958).
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upon occurrence of the quidpro quo, the employer would have a strong self-
interest to ensure it never occurs.
These policies supporting strict liability are inapplicable to offensive work
environment harassment. No official action is involved in creating an offen-
sive work environment and the employer lacks the opportunities to create in-
ternal safeguards. At best, the employer can articulate a vigorous policy
against sexual harassment and provide an effective procedure to report and
resolve any violations. 132 The initiative to report such violations, however,
remains with the employee; any procedure, however well designed, will re-
main ineffective unless the employee chooses to use it. Because an employer
depends on notification by the employee before it can remedy an offensive
work environment, strict liability for such harassment would place an undue
burden on the employer. Unlike the quidpro quo situation, strict liability
would subject the employer to liabilities for events over which it can exert little
prior control. The knowledge standard avoids this undue burden since liabil-
ity is not imposed unless the employer has notice of the harassment and subse-
quently refuses to provide a remedy.
Under this policy analysis, strict liability emerges as the appropriate stan-
dard of liability for supervisory quidpro quo, while the knowledge standard is
better suited for offensive work environment harassment. Although this bifur-
cated standard is not consistent with other Title VII causes of action, sexual
harassment is a unique form of discrimination and warrants this separate anal-
ysis and treatment.
This unique treatment of sexual harassment can be reconciled with the
language of Title VII. 133 The bifurcated standard imposes liability on the em-
ployer for the discriminatory acts of its agents, as required by Title VII,1 34
when that agent is acting in the course of his agency. If the supervisor uses the
power of his agency to effect the harassment, the bifurcated standard imposes
strict liability on the employer. When the supervisor makes no such use of this
power, however, as in an offensive work environment, he is no longer acting as
an agent and strict liability is not required.
The bifurcated test applied in Henson and Katz is derived from sound
analysis of on-the-job sexual harassment and represents the better rule. In
cases of quidpro quo harassment, strict liability clearly is warranted. The em-
ployer created the supervisory authority and, hence, is held liable for its mis-
use. Strict liability would not impose an undue burden on the employer
because the employer itself possesses the means to control incidents of quidpro
quo harassment through appropriate safeguards. Strict liability, moreover,
would encourage employers to create such safeguards, and would give em-
ployees needed protection from this form of sexual harassment.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
133. One argument advanced against this unique approach is that the language in Title VII
mandates strict liability in all cases of supervisory harassment. See supra text accompanying notes
58-60.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
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In cases of offensive work environment harassment, however, strict liabil-
ity would not serve any policy or enforcement objective. No official action is
involved in such harassment, eliminating the possibility of prior internal re-
view by the employer. Thus, the employer is entitled to notice so that he can
correct the situation. The knowledge standard provides such notice.
The bifurcated approach allows a reasoned analysis of each incident of
sexual harassment and responds effectively, while avoiding the inequities that
can occur under the pure strict liability and pure knowledge standards. Be-
cause a national standard of liability is essential for effective protection against
supervisory sexual harassment, courts should follow the Eleventh and Fourth
Circuits by adopting the bifurcated standard.
DAVID J. BURGE
Corporation Law-Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.: Delaware
Reevaluates State-Law Limitations on Take Out Mergers
The evolution of modem, "liberal" corporation acts' has elicited a spir-
ited debate among commentators and practitioners ever since New Jersey en-
acted the first modem liberal corporation act in 1896. Recently, this debate2
has been particularly acute with regard to the propriety of take out mergers3
1. The trend toward liberalization of state corporation acts initially served to meet the grow-
ig needs of corporations in the expanding economy of the late 19th and early 20th centuies. See
generally Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: R6flections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
663-68 (1974). Early in the 20th century the leading industrial states began to remove the limits
on both the size and powers of corporations. As states realized the potential revenue to be derived
by inducing major corporations to incorporate and locate within their boundaries, this liberaliza-
tion process accelerated. This trend toward liberal corporation acts has been characterized as the
"race to the bottom." Cary, supra, at 666. For general discussions of the history of corporate
statutes, see J. DAviS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS (1917); J.
HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BusNESs CORI'ORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
1780-1970 (1970); Berle, HistoricalInheritance of4merican Corporations, in CONFERENCE ON SO-
CIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS, 3 THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT
189 (E. Cahn ed. 1950); Cary, supra; ConardAn Overview of the Laws of Corporations, 71 MICH.
L. REv. 621 (1973); Folk, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. B.J. 409
(1968); Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DuKE L.J. 875; Jennings, The Role of the
States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 193 (1958);
Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling"?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 599 (1965).
2. Borden, Going Private--Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 987 (1974);
Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporation Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 297
(1974); Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Brudney & Chirelstein,4 Restatement]; Goldman & Wolfe, In Response to '!4
Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts," 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 683 (1977); Greene, Corporate
Freeze-Out Mergers: A ProposedAnalysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 487 (1976).
3. The merger in which a majority stockholder pays cash as consideration for all, or sub-
stantially all, the remaining publicly held minority shares has been variously described as a take
out, cash out, squeeze out, and freeze out. References to the majority stockholder as the possessor
of coercive power is not limited or confined to a person or persons owning a majority of the voting
stock in the target corporation but includes those whose control of the enterprise through stock
ownership and domination of the proxy machinery effectively enables them to determine the
terms of the merger. Brudney & Chirelstein,.4 Restatement, supra note 2, at 1358 n.10. This note
will use the term "take out" to describe this transaction.
There are generally three situations in which a take out merger can occur: (1) two-step or
second step mergers, (2) going private transactions, and (3) mergers of affiliates (parent-subsidiary
mergers). Two-step take out mergers involve a controlling public corporation-as opposed to a
controlling individual or group of individuals---that acquires another public corporation through
the culmination of a single plan effected over a short time. In the typical two-step merger scena-
rio, an attacking corporation offers to purchase greater than 50% of the shares of a target corpora-
tion. After a successful tender offer, the attacking corporation merges the target corporation into
itself or a subsidiary.
A "true" going private transaction .. . is one by which an individual or a group of
individuals controlling a public corporation undertake a corporate transaction in order
to acquire, either immediately or on a deferred basis, the entire equity interest in the
corporation. The corporate transaction may take any one of several forms: a merger, a
reverse split or other form of charter amendment, a sale of assets, or a dissolution ...
In a typical going private transaction, the founder of a company that had previously
gone public elects to reverse his steps and restore the corporation to the status of sole
ownership.
A. BORDEN, GOING PRIVATE § 1.02, at 1-3 (1982). Finally, a merger of affiliates involves a pro-
posed take out merger between a parent corporation and a subsidiary corporation that the parent
has controlled for an extended period of time. Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note
2, at 1370. As such, mergers between affiliates are distinguished from two-step mergers because
TXAK OUT MERGERS
and the appropriate judicial and legislative role in protecting minority stock-
parent-subsidiary mergers are not the product of an arm's length deal. Id. at 1371. In the typical
parent-subsidiary merger, the parent corporation controls a majority of the subsidiary's board of
directors either through interlocking directorates or by officers of the parent sitting as members of
the subsidiary's board. Id. at 1370.
An excellent historical perspective on the law of take out mergers is provided in Weiss, The
Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. RaV. 624 (1981). Professor
Weiss divides the historical evolution of take out mergers into four phases. Phase I was character-
ized by the common-law vested rights approach in which one stockholder in a corporation could
block all other stockholders from making any fundamental changes in the corporation's business
or charter. Id. at 626. This approach was based on the interpretation of the corporate charter as a
contract both among the corporation's stockholders and between the state of incorporation and
the corporation. Id. at 627-29. See also Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Share-
holders, and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 69, 77-82.
Phase II was the beginning of liberalization in which state legislatures recognized that unani-
mous stockholder approval requirements "created the potential for tyranny by the minority, thus
impeding economic progress by blocking desirable commercial transactions." Weiss, supra, at
629. States responded by passing statutes providing for "sales of assets, mergers and consolida-
tions, and voluntary licjuidations, when approved by a corporation's board of directors and a
majority or supramajonty (rather than all) of [the] stockholders." Id. The courts, however, did
not hesitate to exercise their equitable powers in this phase to limit perceived abuses of the stat-
utes, as the following passage indicates:
"With reference to the power given to the majority or a certain proportion to dis-
solve, to sell all the assets, to merge or consolidate .. . the courts have generally implied
equitable limitations to reach just results. The wide powers granted [by statute] have not
been interpreted to be unrestricted .... The use of these devices by the majority...
has, as a rule, been strongly disapproved. Where merger or consolidation has been
sought, fair terms and equality of treatment have been required, and the stockholder has
not been forced to take the value of his shares except when these conditions have been
met, and, of course, any others that the statute has prescribed."
Id at 631 (quoting Lattin, Equitable Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers Given to Majority
Stockholders, 30 MICH. L. Rav. 645, 664-65 (1932)).
Phase III was marked by the first cash merger statutes. Florida was the first state to adopt a
cash merger statute. Id at 632. The statute provided that merger or consolidation agreements
"may provide for the distribution of cash, notes or bonds, in whole or in part, in lieu of stock to
stockholders of the constituent corporations or any of them." Act of June 1, 1925, ch. 10096, § 36,
1925 Fla. Laws 134 (current version codified at FLA. STAT. ANN'. § 607.214 (West 1977)). There is
some question, however, whether the early cash merger statutes were intended to authorize take
outs:
[Tihe conclusion most consistent with the available evidence is that the first cash
merger statutes were enacted as part of a general effort to provide additional flexibility in
the structuring of mergers, particularly since cash clearly could be used in bona fide
business combinations accomplished by sales of assets. There is no evidence that the
draftsmen of [these early] cash merger statutes anticipated that the statutes would be
construed to authorize take outs, and a significant amount of evidence suggests that the
draftsmen viewed take outs to be generally prohibited.
Weiss, supra, at 641.
Finally, phase IV is characterized by the legitimization of cash take out mergers. The first
cash merger statute interpreted to authorize cash take outs was the New York short-form merger
provision for gas and electric companies holding more than 95% of their subsidiary's stock. Id at
641-43. See Act of May 28, 1936, ch. 778, § 12(1), 1936 N.Y. Laws 1658 (current version codified
at N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 901(a)(1) (McKinney 1963)). This provision was justified by the New
York State Joint Legislative Committee because "'the consolidation of operating companies...
[is desirable] to effectuate greater economies, more efficient management and rate reductions.'"
Weiss, supra at 642 (quoting Jt. Legislative Committee to Investigate Utilities, Report, Doc. No.
78, 159th Sess. 149 (1936), reprinted in 19 N.Y. Legis. Documents (1936)). Although the statute
was passed in 1936, the first case challenging the statute's constitutionality was Beloff v. Consoli-
dated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949). The court rejected plaintiff's vested-right
claim and "upheld the statute on the ground that 'the merged corporation's shareholder has only
one real right; to have the value of his holding protected, and that protection is given him by his
right to an appraisal.'" Weiss, supra, at 643 (quoting Beloff, 300 N.Y. at 19, 87 N.E.2d at 564). In
a similar challenge to the Delaware short-form merger statute the Delaware Supreme Court re-
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holders.4 Since Delaware is considered the leader in the "race to the bot-
tom,"'5 considerable attention was focused on the Delaware Supreme Court's
opinion in Singer v. Magnovox Co. 6 The Singer court concluded that a pro-
posed take out merger "made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority
stockholders, [was] an abuse of the corporate process,"'7 even though the
merger complied literally with the Delaware corporation statutes.8 Thus, the
court held that a merger, undertaken without any purpose other than the elim-
ination of the minority stockholders, was a violation of the fiduciary duty
owed by the majority stockholders to the minority.9 In Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc. ,o however, the court rejected the Singer "business purpose" test as a de-
parture from previous case law and concluded that no "additional meaningful
protection is afforded minority shareholders by the business purpose require-
jected a stockholder's challenge to a take out merger. Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 38
Del. Ch. 514, 154 A.2d 893 (1959). In Coyne the court relied on the state's reserved power to
amend corporate statutes to hold that the statute did not unconstitutionally deprive plaintiffs of
their vested constitutional rights. Id. at 521-22, 154 A.2d at 897-98. The court also rejected plain-
tiffs' contention that "expulsion of a shareholder from the enterprise in which he has invested is
contrary to the settled policy of the law." Id. at 517, 154 A.2d at 895; see Weiss, supra, at 650-51.
4. See, e.g., Arsht, Minority Stockholder Freezeouts Under Delaware Law, 32 Bus. LAW.
1495 (1977); Balotti, The Elimination o/the Minority Interests by Mergers Pursuant to § 251 o/the
General Corporation Law of Delaware, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 63 (1976); Brudney, A Note on Going
Private, 61 VA. L. REv. 1019 (1975); Gannon,An Evaluation ofthe SEC's New Going Private Rule,
7 J. CORP. LAW 55 (1981); Weiss, supra note 3; Comment, Shareholders' Rights in Short-Form
Mergers: The New Delaware Formula, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 687 (1981); Note, Delaware Corporation
Law. Weinberger v. UOP, IncA Limitation of Singer Fairness Standards?, 42 U. Pirr. L. REV.
915 (1981).
5. The attempt by state legislatures to develop the most liberal general corporation act has
been characterized as the race to the bottom. See supra note 1. The leader in the race to the
bottom is considered to be Delaware because the Delaware Act is considered the least restrictive
act with regard to the interests of the corporation. See Cary, supra note 1, at 663-70.
6. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). See McBride, Delaware Corporate Law: Judicial Scrutiny of
Mergers-The Aftermath of Singer v. The Magnovox Company, 33 Bus. LAW. 2231 (1978); Note,
Singer v. Magnovox Co.: Delaware Imposes Restrictions on Freeze-Out Mergers, 66 CALIF. L.
REv. 118 (1978); Note, Delaware Chills Freeze-Outs: A Critical Brief of Singer v. The Magnovox
Co. and Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc., 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 426 (1978); Note,
Singer v. Magnovox Co.: Minority Rights in Freeze-out Mergers, 83 DICK. L. REv. 159 (1978);
Note, Singer v. Magnovox and Cash Take-Out Mergers, 64 VA. L. REV. 1101 (1978).
7. Singer, 380 A.2d at 980.
8. Singer involved a challenge to a long-form merger authorized by DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 251 (1983). The court described § 251 as follows:
Section 251 authorizes a merger and any judicial consideration of that kind of together-
ness must begin from that premise.
Section 251 also specifies in detail the procedures to be followed in accomplishing a
merger. Briefly, these include approvals by the directors of each corporation and by
"majority [vote] of the outstanding stock of' each corporation, followed by the execution
and filing of formal documents. The consideration given to the shareholders of a constit-
uent corporation in exchange for their stock may take the form of "cash, property, rights
or secunties of any other corporation." § 251(b)(4). A shareholder who objects to the
merger and is dissatisfied with the value of the consideration given for his shares may
seek an appraisal under 8 Del C § 262.
Singer, 380 A.2d at 973-74. The court concluded that "[iun this appeal it is uncontroverted thatdefendants complied with the stated requirements of § 251." Id. at 975.
9. Singer, 380 A.2d at 980.
10. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (en banc) [hereinafter cited as Weinberger 111, rev'g 426 A.2d
1333 (Del. Ch. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Weinberger 11]. In Weinberger I, 409 A.2d 1262 (Del.
Ch. 1979), plaintiffs complaint was dismissed. See infra note 16. Weinberger 111 was decided just
five and one-half years after Singer.
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ment."I' Instead, the court announced a newly formulated fiduciary fairness
test based on the "entire fairness" of the transaction. To ensure the effective-
ness of this test and to balance the corporate necessity of finality in merger
transactions with the need for minority stockholder protection, the court liber-
alized the appraisal proceeding 12 and mandated stockholder objections to this
basic remedy.
This note examines the development of the business purpose test 13 and
analyzes the Weinberger court's rejection of it. It concludes that the court's
failure to resolve the underlying policy considerations relevant to the various
types of take out mergers and the internal inconsistencies in the court's reason-
ing provide inadequate guidance for the lower courts and undermine the prec-
edential value of the Weinberger decision.
Plaintiff in Weinberger, a former stockholder of UOP, challenged a
merger effected by The Signal Companies, Inc., UOP's former majority stock-
holder. 14 On behalf of the class composed of all UOP stockholders who, as of
the date the merger was effectuated,' 5 had not exchanged their shares for the
merger price, plaintiff's amended complaint16 attacked the transaction on the
11. Weinberger HI, 457 A.2d at 715.
12. An appraisal is a judicial proceeding in which the court determines the fair value of the
minority stockholder's interest. In Delaware the relevant statutory language is in DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1983). Section 262 provides that any stockholder who has complied with the
technical standing requirements of subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g) and has "neither voted in favor
of the merger or consolidation nor consented thereto in writing ... shall be entitled to an ap-
praisal by the Court of Chancery of the fair value of his shares of stock." Id. § 262(a). If the
consideration for the minority stockholders' shares is cash or cash and debt securities, appraisal is
available as of right irrespective of the number of stockholders of the corporation or whether the
shares are listed on a national exchange. Id. § 262(b)(2). In addition, the appraisal right is guar-
anteed if the merger is a short-form merger pursuant to § 253. Id. § 262(b)(3). See also infra note
48. Furthermore, a corporation may provide in its certificate of incorporation that stockholders be
given appraisal rights when certain major corporate events occur, such as a merger or consolida-
tion. Id. § 262(c).
As the ultimate arbiter of the fair value of the shares, the Court of Chancery appraises the
shares, "determining their fair value exclusive of any element of value arising from the accom-
plishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with a fair rate of interest
." Id. § 262(h).
13. See infra note 66.
14. Both The Signal Companies, Inc. and UOP, Inc. were incorporated in Delaware. The
merger was effectuated between UOP and Sigco, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of The Signal
Companies. Weinberger II, 426 A.2d at 1335. "As a result of the merger, UOP, as the surviving
entity, became the wholly-owned subsidiary of Signal, and UOP's former minority stockholders
were paid the sum of $21 per share for their former interests in UOP." Id.
15. The merger was effectuated on May 26, 1978. Originally, plaintiff William Weinberger
sought to represent the class of all UOP stockholders who, as of May 26, 1978, had not exchanged
their shares for the merger price. Id After the trial, plaintiff filed a motion seeking "to enlarge the
class so as to include all former stockholders of UOP as of the time of the merger," id, including
those stockholders who had exchanged their shares for the $21 merger price. Since the trial court
entered judgment in favor of UOP, Signal, and Lehman Brothers, the Chancellor did not consider
plaintiff's motion to enlarge the class. Id at 1363. The Delaware Supreme Court, however, or-
dered that plaintifi's request to enlarge the class be granted on remand. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d
at 715.
16. In a pretrial ruling the Chancellor had ordered the complaint dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 703 n.4. Plaintiff had not alleged specific acts
of fraud, misrepresentation, or other items of misconduct to demonstrate the unfairness of the
merger terms to the minority. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 409 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Weinberger 1].
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theory that the majority's offer of twenty-one dollars per share was grossly
inadequate. Defendants were The Signal Companies, Inc.,17 UOP, Inc.,18 and
Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc.19
Signal acquired its 50.5 percent interest in UOP in 1975 following friendly
arm's length negotiations between the boards of Signal and UOP.20 After this
share purchase, Signal nominated seven of the thirteen UOP directors.21 Al-
though Signal did not anticipate acquisition of the remaining 49.5 percent of
UOP's outstanding shares at the time of the initial purchase, Signal's inability
to find suitable investments or realistic acquisition opportunities for its excess
cash caused the company to consider obtaining all of UOP's stock. To evalu-
ate this alternative, Signal's management instigated a feasibility study. The
study was performed by two officers of Signal who were also directors of Sig-
nal and UOP.22 They concluded that Signal should acquire the remaining
17. The trial court described Signal as follows:
Signal is a diversified, technologically based company operating through various
subsidiaries. Two of its wholly-owned subsidiaries are The Garrett Corp. and Mack
Trucks, Inc. The former is engaged in the design, engineering, manufacture and sale of
transportation related equipment and services, including those involved in the aerospace
industry. The latter is similarly involved in the area of heavy-duty motor trucks and
truck tractors. Through substantial investments in other companies Signal is also en-
gaged in the manufacture of industrial products, land development, radio and television
broadcasting, entertainment and shipping. Its stock is publicly held and is listed on the
New York, Philadelphia and Pacific Stock Exchanges.
Weinberger II, 426 A.2d at 1335.
18. The court described UOP as follows:
UOP, formerly known as Universal Oil Products Co., is a diversified industrial com-
pany which, as of the beginning of 1978, was engaged in six major lines of business.
These included petroleum and petrochemical services and related products, construction,
fabricated metal products, transportation equipment products, chemicals and plastics,
and other products and services including land development, lumber products, and a
process for the conversion of municipal sewage sludge into organic soil supplements. Its
stock was publicly held and was listed on the New York Stock Exchange at the time.
Id. at 1335.
19. "Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc. is an investment banking firm with a long-standing
business relationship with UOP." Id. James W. Glanville, a partner of Lehman Brothers, was a
UOP director. Id at 1338. Lehman Brothers was retained to give a "fairness opinion" regarding
the $21 per share offered by Signal. Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 706. Prior to the final oral
argument before the Delaware Supreme Court, plaintiff dropped his complaint against Lehman
Brothers. Id. at 703 n.3.
20. As a result of these negotiations Signal agreed to purchase 1.5 million of UOP's author-
ized but previously unissued shares at a price of $21 per share. This purchase was contingent,
however, upon the success of a cash tender offer by Signal for 4.3 million publicly held shares of
UOP. Although 78.2% of the publicly held shares were tendered at this time (approximately 7.8
million), Signal purchased only enough shares to become a 50.5% majority stockholder. We/n-
berger I, 426 A.2d at 1336.
21. At the annual meeting following the share purchase, Signal nominated only six of the
thirteen UOP directors. Five were directors or employees of Signal and the sixth, a partner in the
investment banking firm of Lazard Freres & Co., had been one of Signal's representatives in the
negotiations with UOP. Later in 1975, the president and chief executive officer of UOP, who also
held a seat on the UOP board, retired. Signal named Crawford, a long-time employee and senior
executive vice president of the Garrett Corp., see supra note 17, to replace him as president and
board member. Weinberger 11, 426 A.2d at 1336.
22. Weinberger11, 426 A.2d at 1337. These officers were: Arledge, vice president and direc-
tor of planning for Signal, and Chitiea, senior vice president and chief financial officer of Signal.
Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 705. This feasibility study played a critical role in the supreme
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shares of UOP at any price up to twenty-four dollars per share. 23
After the feasibility study had been concluded, Signal's executive commit-
tee was convened to consider the acqusition through a take out merger. The
committee consulted with Crawford, UOP's president and chief executive of-
ficer,24 before determining that an acqusition price of twenty to twenty-one
dollars per share would be fair to Signal and the minority stockholders of
UOP. 25 On February 28, 1978, Signal issued a press release announcing that
"negotiations" were being conducted with UOP for the purpose of acquiring
the outstanding minority shares for cash.26
Following this public announcement, Crawford retained Lehman Broth-
ers27 to render a fairness opinion about the price offered by Signal. After con-
court's conclusion that Signal did not meet its fiduciary obligations. See infra notes 92-98 and
accompanying text.
23. Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 705. The report described the advantages to Signal of the
acquisition and outlined the purposes of the merger as follows:
1) Provides an outstanding investment opportunity for Signal--(Better than any re-
cent acquisition we have seen).
2) Increases Signal's earnings.
3) Facilitates the flow of resources between Signal and its subsidiaries--(Big fac-
tor-works both ways).
4) Provides cost savings potential for Signal and UOP.
5) Improves the percentage of Signal's 'operating earnings' as opposed to 'holding
company earnings'.
6) Simplifies the understanding of Signal.
7) Facilitates technological exchange among Signal's subsidiaries.
8) Eliminates potential conflicts of interest.
Id. at 708 (parentheses indicate handwritten comments of Arledge).
24. See supra note 21. As a courtesy to UOP's president, Crawford was invited to attend the
executive committee meeting. Prior to the meeting, Crawford met privately with Signal's board
chairman Walkup, and President Shumway. They asked Crawford for his reaction to the pro-
posed price range of $20 to $21 per share. Crawford indicated that he thought the offer was
"generous," but that certain internal problems might develop at UOP if its employees were not
given some assurances of their future position in a wholly owned Signal subsidiary and its key
personnel were not compensated for their incentive stock options which could be wiped out by a
merger. See Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 705.
25. At the time of the first public announcement, UOP's stock was trading at $14.50 per
share. The highest market price for the years 1974-1978 was $18.75 in 1974. The average high
trading price during those years was $17.05, and the average closing price was $13.20. See Wein-
berger II, 426 A.2d at 1361-62.
26. See Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 706. At trial plaintiff contended that the use of the word
"negotiations" was misleading because Crawford immediately agreed to the suggested price range
of $20 to $21 per share. Weinberger II, 426 A.2d at 1350-51. He contended that the evidence did
not reveal anything that could be considered negotiation. Plaintiff further contended that UOP's
subsequent modification of their proxy statement to shareholders was evidence of misleading press
releases. Id at 1351. UOP had replaced the word "negotiations" with "discussions" when the
SEC sought details of the negotiations. Weinberger II, 457 A.2d at 706-08. Although the
supreme court did not hold that these discrepancies constituted misleading information, the court
did note that the result might have been different had an independent negotiating board consisting
of the non-Signal UOP board members been used. Id at 709 n.7. See infra notes 92-98 and
accompanying text.
27. Two reasons were given by Crawford for the selection of Lehman Brothers.
First, the time schedule between the announcement and the board meetings was short
(only three business days) and since Lehman Brothers had been acting as UOP's invest-
ment banker for many years, he felt that it would be in the best position to respond on
such short notice. Secondly, James W. Glanville, a long-time director of UOP, was also
a partner of Lehman Brothers and had long acted as a financial advisor to UOP. Craw-
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tacting UOP's outside directors, and after various contacts with Signal officers,
Crawford advised Signal's chairman that "as a result of his communications
with UOP's non-Signal directors, it was his feeling that the price would have
to be the top of the proposed range, or $21 per share, if the approval of UOP's
outside directors was to be obtained."'28 On March 6, 1978, just four business
days after the initial public announcement, Signal and UOP's boards of direc-
tors adopted resolutions agreeing to the proposed merger at a price of twenty-
one dollars per share.29 By the terms of the merger proposal, consummation of
the merger required approval of a "majority of UOP's outstanding minority
shares voting at the stockholders' meeting at which the merger would be con-
sidered, and that the minority shares voting in favor of the merger, when cou-
pled with Signal's 50.5% interest would have to comprise at least two-thirds of
all UOP shares."30 The merger was approved by UOP's minority stockholders
at their annual meeting on May 26, 1978.31
Following the UOP stockholder approval of the merger, plaintiff attacked
the validity of the transaction and sought to set the merger aside or, in the
alternative, to receive money damages. During the eleven day trial,32 plaintiff
ford felt that Glanville's familiarity with UOP as a member of its board as well as being
a member of Lehman Brothers would also be of assistance in enabling Lehman Brothers
to render an opinion within the existing time constraints.
Weinberger 11, 426 A.2d at 1338.
28. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 706.
29. On the date that the merger was to be approved, both boards convened. Telephone com-munications were maintained so that the dual directors could participate in both meetings.
Walkup, Signal's board chairman, attended the UOP meeting to present Signal's views and an-
swer any questions the non-Signal UOP directors might have. On the advice of counsel, Signal's
UOP directors abstained from voting. (The only exceptions were Crawford, UOP president, and
Signal's Lazard Freres & Co. representative, who voted in favor of the transaction.). See id at
706-07.
30. See id at 707. The effect of this voting structure was to neutralize the majority's voting
power by giving the minority veto power over the transaction.
Professor Borden has maintained that neutralized voting, absent proof of faulty disclosure,
would be effective against ajudicial attack. See Borden, supra note 2, at 1039. In a recent treatise,
A. BORDEN, GoING PRIVATE (1982), he renews this opinion and supports his view with the court's
analysis in Weinberger I and 11. Borden's reasoning flows from a practical view of the judicial
analysis:
Where a majority in interest of the minority, interested enough to express its views at the
shareholder meeting, elects to accept that higher price [the offering price is invariably
above the market price], a court would have to possess an unusual degree of confidence
in its own financial acumen to say to the approving majority that their securities must
relapse in price to their pre-going private announcement market level because the judge,
aspaterfamilias, doesn't think it is good for them ....
Id. § 4.06, at 4-17. This "reality" seems to have been recognized by the Weinberger I opinion.
The court stated that "where corporate action has been approved by an informed vote of a major-
ity of the minority shareholders, we conclude that the burden entirely shifts to the plaintiff to show
that the transaction was unfair to the minority." Weinberger 11I, 457 A.2d at 703.
31. There were 11,488,302 shares outstanding as of the record date of the meeting, 5,688,302
of which were owned by Signal. Although only 56% of the minority shares voted at the meeting(3,208,652 shares), 51.9% of the total minority (2,953,812 shares) voted for the merger. Signal's
stock and the minority shares voting for the merger totaled 76.2% (8,642,114 shares). Weinberger
III, 457 A.2d at 708.
32. Over 3000 pages of testimony were offered at trial, and the trial exhibits comprised sev-
eral volumes. Post-trial briefing and argument were extensive. The trial court concluded that "[i]t
would be difficult to believe that anything worth arguing about has been omitted." Weinberger I1,
426 A.2d at 1363.
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offered evidence to support his allegations that: (1) no legally proper purpose
for the merger existed; (2) Signal had abused its majority position by dissemi-
nating misleading proxy information and press releases; (3) UOP's Signal-con-
trolled board had failed to execute its fiduciary duty to its stockholders; and
(4) the true value of the minority shares was not less than twenty-six dollars
per share. The court of chancery rejected each of these contentions and held
that "the terms of the merger were legally fair to the plaintiff and other minor-
ity stockholders of UOP. ''33
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the following ques-
tions: (1) whether a plaintiff in a suit challenging a take out merger must allege
specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or other items of misconduct to
demonstrate the unfairness of the merger terms to the minority; (2) whether
the burden of proof shifts from the majority stockholder to the plaintiff when
the merger has been approved by an informed vote of a majority of the minor-
ity stockholders; (3) whether the merger was fair in terms of the adequacy of
defendants' disclosures; (4) whether the price offered by the majority was fair
to the minority stockholders; and (5) whether the requirement of a legitimate
business purpose for the merger was still the law of Delaware.34
The court first approved the Chancellor's conclusion that a plaintiff in a
suit challenging a take out merger must allege specific acts of fraud, misrepre-
sentation, or other misconduct when the complaint reveals that the approval
or rejection of the merger was left to the minority stockholders. 35 Second, the
court shifted the ultimate burden of proof to the plaintiff when the corporate
action taken was approved by an informed vote of the minority stockhold-
ers.36 This shifting of the burden of proof is closely tied to the third inquiry.
The court concluded that Signal failed to establish that the vote of the minor-
ity was an informed vote.37 Since material information relating to the bar-
gaining positions of Signal and UOP was withheld, the court held that the
merger did not meet the test of fairness and, thus, no burden shifted to plaintiff
33. Id
34. Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 703.
35. Id See also Weinberger 11, 426 A.2d at 1342; Weinberger I, 409 A.2d at 1267. In Wein-
berger I the Chancellor stated this proposition as follows:
As I see it, under Singer, a complaint does not have to allege the particulars of why
a merger is unfair so long as it alleges a use of its position by a majority shareholder to
cash-out the minority on inadequate terms for no sufficient business purpose other than
to get rid of them. Such general allegations coupled with factual assertions showing a
use of the majority position is sufficient to state a cause of action and to place the burden
on the majority shareholder, as part of its fiduciary duty, to prove th.s fairness of the
merger terms as opposed to requiring the plaintiff to prove that they were unfair. But
where the complaint fails to charge a use of its majority position by a shareholder to
bring about a predetermined result affecting the minority, and simply charges, in es-
sence, that the terms of the merger proposed by the majority shareholder were unfair,
then it seems to me that the burden should then be on the plaintiff to allege and prove
the unfairness, or to allege fraud or some other basis for condemning the terms of the
merger plan.
Id.
36. Weinberger II, 457 A.2d at 703.
37. Id. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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by virtue of the minority stockholder vote.38
The fourth question addressed by the supreme court concerned the ade-
quacy of the price offered by the majority. The court rejected the long-stand-
ing "Delaware block" 39 approach to valuation applied by the Chancellor and
announced a liberalized appraisal proceeding based on any generally accepted
techniques used in the financial community and the courts.40 Finally, the
court reconsidered and rejected the business purpose requirement enunciated
in Singer.4' The supreme court, en banc, reversed the Chancellor's findings
that both the circumstances of the merger and the price paid the minority
stockholders were fair, and remanded the case for further proceedings consis-
tent with its opinion.42
The Weinberger decision represents a further modification of the develop-
ing law of take out mergers. At common law, stockholders had a veto power
over all fundamental changes in the corporation's business or charter.43 The
evolution of modem liberal corporation acts, however, rejected this vested
rights approach.44 Although courts initially had required equity consideration
in merger transactions, by the late 1960s many states recognized the right of a
majority stockholder or group of stockholders to effectuate a merger and elim-
inate the minority stockholders by exchanging their shares for cash.45
The first Delaware case upholding a cash take out merger was Coyne v.
Park & Tiford Distillers Corp. ,46 decided in 1959. In Coyne plaintiffs con-
tended that "expulsion of a shareholder from the enterprise in which he has
invested . . . is contrary to the settled policy of the law,"47 and that section
253,48 which authorized short-form mergers for cash, was unconstitutional as
applied since the minority stockholders were deprived of vested contractual
rights.49 The supreme court rejected these contentions and concluded that the
statute clearly authorized cash alone as consideration in a short-form
38. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 703.
39. See infra note 89.
40. Weinberger 11I, 457 A.2d at 703-04, 712-13.
41. Id. at 704, 715.
42. Weinberger II, 457 A.2d at 715.
43. See Weiss, supra note 3.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 38 Del. Ch. 514, 154 A.2d 893 (1959). Plaintiff in Coyne challenged a short-form merger
by Schenley Industries, Inc., the 96% majority stockholder of Park & Tilford Distillers Corp.
47. Id. at 517, 154 A.2d at 895.
48. The Delaware short-form merger statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1983), authorizes
a merger of a 90% owned subsidiary into its parent without prior notice. In a § 253 short-form
merger the parent corporation can merge its subsidiary corporation into itself by executing, ac-
knowledging, and filing a certificate of ownership and merger setting forth a copy of the resolution
of its board of directors authorizing the merger. If the subsidiary corporation is not wholly
owned, however, the resolution "shall state the terms and conditions of the merger, including the
securities, cash, property, or rights to be issued, paid, delivered, or granted by the surviving corpo-
ration upon surrender of each share of the subsidiary corporation or corporations not owned by
the parent corporation." Id.
49. Plaintiffs argued as follows:
Each acquired his shares before the passage of the 1957 amendment. When he
bought his stock Section 251 permitted only the conversion of shares into shares in a
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merger.50 The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute under the "re-
served power" of the Delaware statutes.5
1
Four years later, in Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc. 52 the court reaf-
firmed Coyne and implied that, absent circumstances which the court could
not anticipate, appraisal was the stockholders' exclusive remedy in short-form
mergers.
Indeed it is difficult to imagine a case under the short merger statute
in which there could be such actual fraud as would entitle a minority
to set aside the merger. This is so because the very purpose of the
statute is to provide the parent corporation with a means of eliminat-
ing the minority shareholder's interest in the enterprise. Thereafter
the former shareholder has only a monetary claim. This power of
the parent to eliminate the minority is a complete answer to plain-
tifi's charge of breach of trust against the directors. .... 53
Although the court's statement was unsupported by legislative authority, "fol-
lowing Stauffer the generally accepted view was that section 253 not only au-
thorized, but was enacted to expedite, take out mergers."54
In 1967 Delaware amended its general corporation act to authorize the
use of cash as consideration in long-form mergers.55 Prior to this amendment,
the Delaware courts had imposed broad general fiduciary standards of corpo-
merger. The right to demand in a merger conversion of his shares into other shares
became vested, and no subsequently enacted statute could destroy it.
Coyne, 38 Del. Ch. at 519, 154 A.2d at 897.
50. Id at 519, 154 A.2d at 896. This conclusion has been criticized by Professor Weiss as
without merit in light of the support cited by the court. Weiss, supra note 3, at 651. He states that
the court's conclusion that
"[s]ince 1941, Delaware had allowed use of'shares or other securities' in long-form merg-
ers, which made it possible 'to terminate a shareholder's stock interest by issuing redeem-
able bonds or similar monetary obligations,' [was a conclusion] unsupported by any
Delaware cases and also contrary to the New Jersey courts' interpretation of the compa-
rable provisions of the New Jersey statute.'
Id. (quoting Coyne, 38 Del. Ch. at 517, 154 A.2d at 895).
51. Co~ye, 38 Del. Ch. at 521, 154 A.2d at 897. The court noted that the Delaware general
corporation law" 'may be amended or repealed, at the pleasure of the legislature.'" Id. (quoting
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 364 (repealed 1967)) (now codified at DEL. CODE ANN., title 8, § 394
(1983)). This statute, the court found, "authorize[s] the enactment of statutes changing the rights
of stockholders in respect of shares acquired prior to such enactment." Id. at 522, 154 A.2d at 897.
52. 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962).
53. Id. at 10-11, 187 A.2d at 80.
54. Weiss, supra note 3, at 651-52. See Carl Marks & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 43
Del. Ch. 391, 392-93, 233 A.2d 63, 64 (1967).
55. The Delaware long-form merger statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1983), governs the
merger of two or more corporations when the merger does not involve a greater than 90% parent
corporation.
Section 251 authorizes the merger of two or more domestic corporations pursuant to an
agreement of merger or consolidation adopted, executed, and filed in accordance with the provi-
sions of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 103, 251(c) (1983). To initiate the merger process, the board of
directors of each corporation must approve an agreement of merger or consolidation. Id.
§ 251(b). Once this has been accomplished, the agreement of merger or consolidation is submitted
to the stockholders of each corporation at an annual or special meeting called for the purpose of
acting on the agreement. If the agreement is approved by a majority of the outstanding stock of




rate duty and loyalty to corporations on both sides of a long-form merger
transaction.5 6 In Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp. ,5 decided in 1952 before
both Coyne and Stauffer, the court considered whether the terms of a proposed
merger of the Mayflower Hotel Corporation into its parent corporation, Hilton
Hotels Corporation, was fair to the minority stockholders of Mayflower. After
recognizing the "settled rule of law" that Hilton, as the majority stockholder of
Mayflower, occupied a fiduciary position in relation to the minority stockhold-
ers,58 the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that "[s]ince [Hilton stands] on
both sides of the transaction, they bear the burden of establishing its entire
fairness." 59 As such, the merger was subjected to "the test of careful scrutiny
by the courts." 60 Although the supreme court never rejected the applicability
of Sterling's "entire fairness" standard to cash take out mergers after 1967,
most observers believed that the Coyne and Stauffer line of cases relegated the
minority stockholders in long-form, as well as short-form mergers, to the ap-
praisal remedy as their exclusive protection and recourse.61
Given most observers' assumption that a minority stockholder's exclusive
remedy in a take out merger was an appraisal of his shares, the court's opinion
in Singer v. Magnavox Co. 62 was a dramatic reversal in favor of minority
stockholders.63 The court rejected the notion that appraisal was the exclusive
56. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 298, 93 A.2d at 109-110.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Weiss, supra note 3, at 655. See Green v. Sante Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1286 (2d
Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462, 479 n.16 (1977); Singer v. Magnovox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1361-62
(Del. Ch. 1976), rev'd in part and af'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); David J. Greene & Co. v.
Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971). See generally Arsht, supra note 4; Balotti,
supra note 4, at 67-77.
62. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). Singer involved a two-step takeover attempt by North Ameri-
can Philips Corporation (North American). Following a successful tender offer by North Ameri-
can Philips Development Corp. (Development), a subsidiary of North American, Development
sought to eliminate the remaining minority shareholders (approximately 15.9% of the total out-
standing stock) of The Magnovox Company. Plaintiff, a minority stockholder of Magnovox, al-
leged that: (I) the merger was fraudulent in that it did not serve any business purpose other than
the forced removal of public minority stockholders at a grossly inadequate price; (2) defendants
breached their fiduciary duties in approving the merger at a cash price they knew to be grossly
inadequate; and (3) the merger was accomplished in a manner violative of the antifraud provi-
sions of the Delaware Securities Act, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7303 (1983). Since Singer was
considered a complete break with past precedent, numerous notes, articles, and comments have
interpreted its effect. See supra notes 3, 4 & 6.
63. Many observers have speculated on possible reasons for the sudden reversal by the Dela-
ware Supreme Court. See Arsht, supra note 4; Brudney & Chirelstein,, Restatement, supra note
2; Goldman & Wolfe, supra note 2; McBride, supra note 6; Weiss, supra note 3; Comment, stpra
note 4; and Notes cited in supra note 6. The two most persuasive reasons are: the implied threat
of federal solutions if state law failed to provide adequate protection to minority stockholders, and
the perceived inadequacies of the statutory appraisal remedy under the Delaware block approach
to valuation.
In Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs'
allegations that the breach of fiduciary duty by a majority stockholder in a short-form merger
states a cause of action under § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1982), and the corresponding rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982), absent conduct
that "can be fairly viewed as 'manipulative or deceptive."' Sante Fe, 430 U.S. at 473-74. The
Court concluded, however, as follows:
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remedy for minority stockholders who objected to a long-form merger that
technically complied with the statutory requirements. 64 In addition the court
rejected defendants' contention that their offer of fair value fully discharged
the parent corporation's fiduciary obligations.65 The court concluded that a
long-form merger, "made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority share-
As the Court stated in Cori v. Ash ...: "Corporations are creatures of state law, and
investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except
where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation."
We thus adhere to the position that "Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate
transactions which constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement." Super-
intendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Casualty Co, 404 U.S. at 12. There may well be a
need for uniform federal fiduciary standards to govern mergers such as that challenged
in this complaint. But those standards should not be supplied by judicial extension of
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to "cover the corporate universe."
Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479-80 (citations omitted).
The second pre-Singer indication that federal restrictions were imminent was proposed rules
13e-3A and 13e-3B in 1975. SEC Release No. 33-5567, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 80,104 (Feb. 6, 1975). These proposed "going private" rules covered a broad spec-
trum of corporate transactions that had the effect of removing any class of equity security from the
public market. A. BORDEN, supra note 3, at § 2.05.
Proposed Rule 13e-3A required that consideration offered to security holders must "con-
stitute fair value as determined in good faith by the issuer or its affiliate, and shall be no
lower than the consideration recommended jointly by two qualified independant per-
sons." Proposed Rule 13e-3B, on the other hand, required that there be a "valid business
purpose" for the transaction and that the terms of such transaction be "fair."
Id.
In 1977 a new version of rule 13e-3 was proposed. SEC Release No. 33-5884 [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,366 (Nov. 17, 1977). This proposal required both
"substantive and procedural fairness" and provided that any rule 13e-3 transaction that was "un-
fair to unaffiliated security holders" was a "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act." A. BOR-
DEN, supra note 3, at § 2.08. Although the rule that was eventually adopted, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3
(1983); see also SEC Release No. 33-6100 [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,166 (Aug. 2, 1979); retreated substantially from the substantive regulation of its prior drafts, the
threat of federal action prior to Singer was real. (Rule 13e-3, as adopted, seeks to regulate going
private transactions by requiring detailed disclosure of their fairness.) See also Gannon, supra
note 4, at 56.
The second explanation for the court's about face in Singer was the growing perception that
the appraisal remedy was wholly inadequate to protect minority stockholders. As early as 1964,
Professor Vorenberg criticized the appraisal remedy as a justification for rejecting substantive
merger requirements. Vorenberg, Exclusiveness ofthe Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77
HARV. L. REv. 1189(1964). Professor Vorenberg argued that: (1) even under the best of statutory
appraisal procedures, forced resort to an appraisal often will give the stockholder less than his
stock is worth; (2) a stockholder may have some other relationship with the corporation that will
be jeopardized; and (3) in many cases the most serious consequence to a stockholder forced to take
cash when the majority chooses to be rid of him will be the impact of federal capital gains taxes
payable on any appreciation in value of his stock. Id. at 1200-05.
64. Singer, 380 A.2d at 975-77.
65. The court rejected defendants' contention that because the stockholder's right is exclu-
sively in the value of his investment, an appraisal, which by definition results in fair value for the
shares, was the exclusive remedy.
This argument assumes that the right to take is coextensive with the power to take and
that a dissenting stockholder has no legally protected right in his shares, his certificate or
his company beyond a right to be paid fair value when the majority is ready to do this.
Simply stated, such an argument does not square with the duty stated so eloquently and
so forcefully by Chief Justice Layton in CGuth [v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503
(1939)].
Singer, 380 A.2d at 977-78. The duty established in Guth is quoted infra note 80.
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holders, is an abuse of the corporate process"'66 and a violation of the fiduciary
duty owed to the minority stockholders. 67 Thus, to meet the parent corpora-
tion's fiduciary duty after Singer, the majority stockholder was required to
establish a valid business purpose for the merger and demonstrate that the
circumstances satisfied the standard of entire fairness enunciated in Sterling.68
Shortly after the Singer decision was announced, the court broadened the
scope of the business purpose test. In Roland International Corp. v. Naj'ar69
the court rejected Roland's contention that the Delaware short-form merger
statute conclusively presumed a proper purpose.70 The court concluded that
"the principles announced in Singer with respect to a § 251 merger apply to a
§ 253 merger." 71
Although Singer's business purpose test was announced less than six years
before the Delaware Supreme Court considered Weinberger, the Weinberger
court summarily rejected72 its application to take out mergers as "new to our
law of mergers and. . . a departure from prior case law." 73 In light of the
persuasive precedential value of the Delaware courts' interpretations of the
Delaware corporation statutes, this flip-fiopping in the Delaware Supreme
Court's opinions is troublesome. The confusion inherent in the court's an-
nouncement of the business purpose requirement, 74 and evidenced by the sub-
sequent interpretation and application of this standard,75 circumscribed the
66. Singer, 380 A.2d at 980. The court concluded that, "a § 251 merger, made for the sole
purpose of freezing out minority stockholders, is an abuse of the corporate process; and the com-
plaint, which so alleges in this suit, states a cause of action for violation of a fiduciary duty ......
Id. Although this holding has commonly been referred to as a "business purpose" test, the Singer
court clearly did not intend this requirement to be a business purpose test, per se. This conclusion
follows from the fact that the original version of the opinion established a business purpose test,
but this language was subsequently removed by the court and the above quoted phrase was put in
its place. See Note, Singer v. Magnavox and Cash Take-Out Mergers, supra note 6. Since most
commentators use the phrase "business purpose," as did the court in Weinberger III, this note
adopts the phrase with the above caveat.
67. Singer, 380 A.2d at 980.
68. Id. at 980. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
69. 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
70. Id. at 1036.
71. Id. Roland contended that the Stauffer court held that the very purpose of § 253 is to
give the 90% owner a tool for eliminating the minority interest in the enterprise. The court re-
jected defendant's argument that Stauffer should control, concluding that any statement in Stau/-fer inconsistent with the holding that the principles announced in Singer were also applicable to a
short-form merger was overruled. Naij'ar, 407 A.2d at 1036.
72. The court rejected the business purpose test in the third and final part of the opinion,
after the substantive issues had been resolved.
In view of the fairness test which has long been applicable to parent-subsidiary
mergers.... the expanded appraisal remedy now available to shareholders, and the
broad discretion of the Chancellor to fashion such relief as the facts of a given case may
dictate, we do not believe that any additional meaningful protection is afforded minority
shareholders by the business purpose requirement of the trilogy of Singer, Tanzer, Na-jar and their progeny.
Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 715 (citations omitted).
73. Id.
74. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
75. In Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), the court was asked to
resolve an issue explicitly left open by Singer, namely, whether a merger made primarily to ad-
vance the business purpose of the majority stockholder is a violation of the fiduciary duty. See
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thrust and effect of Singer.76
Unfortunately, the court's analysis in Weinberger suffers from similar in-
ternal inconsistencies and the same lack of clarity that contributed to the de-
mise of Singer.77 This confusion is a direct result of the court's failure to
resolve the fundamental issues underlying the law of take out mergers,
namely: (1) what is the nature of a stockholder's interest in the corporation?
and (2) what public policies are important to consider in developing an appro-
priate standard for evaluating take out mergers? 78 Although the ultimate reso-
lution of these questions is the subject of extensive debate and significant
disagreement,79 in order for the court to balance the interests of majority and
minority stockholders, provide an element of certainty in corporate transac-
tions, and avoid protractive litigation, the court must make explicit its under-
lying assumptions.
In Weinberger the court announced that, henceforth, the appropriate
fiduciary standard is the test of entire fairness enunciated in Sterling, absent
the Singer requirement that the elimination of minority stockholders not be
the sole purpose of the merger. The Weinberger court's concept of entire fair-
ness as it relates to take out mergers is rooted in the majority stockholder's
duties of loyalty, honesty, and good faith.80 'The requirement of fairness is
unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction,
Singer, 380 A.2d at 980 n.l 1. The court concluded that Singer could not be read to eliminate the
majority stockholder's right to vote its shares in its own interest. As such, the Tanzer court held
that the majority "need not sacrifice its own interest in dealing with a subsidiary; but that interest
must not be suspect as a subterfuge, the real purpose of which is to rid itself of unwanted minority
shareholders in the subsidiary." Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1124.
The chancery court applied this test in Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978), to
enjoin a cash merger that would have eliminated the 45% interest of the minority in Valhi. The
court based its holding on the reasoning that the basic purpose of the merger was to eliminate the
minority. The court rejected defendant's argument that the merger would lead to tax savings for
the majority and avoid potential conflicts of interest, saying that these conflicts were "somewhat
contrived." Id. at 1377-78. At least one commentator has stated that this opinion "represents a
striking deviation from the Delaware courts' customary reluctance to second-guess corporate man-
agers' business judgments." Weiss, supra note 3, at 669 n.291.
76. Professor Weiss argued that the court's decisions applying the business purpose test may
reflect highly subjective decisions based largely on their assessment of the fairness of the individ-
ual transaction in front of the court at the time. Weiss, supra note 3, at 670-71. This view may
explain the differences in the court's seemingly strong business purpose requirement in Young v.
Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (DeL Ch. 1978), see supra note 75, and the seemingly weak application
in Weinberger I. Weiss, supra note 3, at 671 n.300.
77. See generally Arsht, supra note 4; Brudney & Chirelstein,4 Restatement, supra note 2;
Goldman & Wolfe, supra note 2; McBride, supra note 6; Weiss, supra note 3; Comment, supra
note 4; and Notes cited in supra note 6.
78. Virtually every commentator who has discussed the law of take out mergers has argued
that the transaction should be analyzed in accordance with the nature of the take out. Numerous
legislative and judicial schemes have been proposed to analyze going-private transactions, second
step mergers, and parent-subsidiary mergers. See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate
Mergers and Takeovers, supra note 2; Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 2;
Goldman & Wolfe, supra note 2; Greene, supra note 2; Weiss, supra note 3. AAthough courts have
recognized these commentators' views, they have refused to apply their analyses. See, e.g. , Najlar,
407 A.2d at 1034 n.4.
79. See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, supra note
2; Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 2; Goldman & Wolfe, Mspra note 2; Greene,
supra note 2; Weiss, supra note 3.
80. Singer, 380 A.2d at 977. The classic definition of this standard was stated by Chief Jus-
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he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of
careful scrutiny by the courts."81 This concept of entire fairness has two com-
ponents: fair dealing and fair price.82 To ensure that minority stockholders
receive fair value for their shares, however, the court supplemented this entire
fairness standard with a liberalized appraisal remedy in which "proof of value
by any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in
the financial community and otherwise admissible in court"8 3 can be consid-
ered. Because of internal inconsistencies in the entire fairness standard and
the liberalized appraisal proceeding together with the incompatibility of these
concepts as expressed, the application of the Weinberger opinion to a given
factual situation is unclear.
Although the court indicated that the entire fairness standard is not a
bifurcated test,84 the method of analysis applied by the court is clearly indica-
tive of a two prong test.85 First, the court considered the question of fair deal-
ing and concluded that the Chancellor's findings-that Signal did not misuse
its position as the majority stockholder of UOP to disseminate less than candid
proxy information, 6 or violate its corresponding fiduciary duty87 -must be
tice Layton in Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939), and has been repeated in
both Singer, 380 A.2d at 977, and Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 710.
While technically not trustees, [corporate directors] stand in a fiduciary relation to the
corporation and its stockholders. A public policy, existing through the years, and de-
rived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established
a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the
most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of
the corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that
would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his
skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable and
lawful exercise of its powers. The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty
to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.
The occasions for the determination of honesty, good faith and loyal conduct are many
and varied, and no hard and fast rule can be formulated. The standard of loyalty is
measured by no fixed scale.
Guth, 23 Del. Ch. at 270, 5 A.2d at 510.
81. Weinberger II[, 457 A.2d at 710. See also Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 681
(Del. Ch. 1969), aft'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249
A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968); Sterling, 33 DeL Ch. at 298, 93 A.2d at 110.
82. Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 711.
83. Id. at 713. The origin of this concept in the decisions concerning the business purpose
test appears to be Justice Quillen's dissent in Najiar, in which he expressed the following
reservations:
Certainly this Court should not foster an unnecessary damage forum because of any
judicial limitation placed on the statutory appraisal procedure. Rather, we should en-
courage this legislatively established valuation process to be open to generally accepted
techniques of evaluation used in other areas of business and law.
407 A.2d at 1040 n.12 (Quillen, J., dissenting).
84. See Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 711. It is unclear how the test can be applied in any
other way. The inquiries into the fairness of the transaction in terms of structure and disclosure
(fair dealing) and in terms of consideration offered per share (fair price) are concerned with totally
unrelated issues. The court did not intend to imply that a majority stockholder could meet its
fiduciary obligation without satisfying both prongs of the test.
85. Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 711-15.
86. Weinberger II, 426 A.2d at 1353-56.
87. Id. at 1356.
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reversed.88 Then the court considered the trial court's treatment of the price
offered by Signal89 and concluded that the Chancellor's valuation approach
was no longer the law of Delaware. 90 Because the trial court had not consid-
ered plaintiff's evidence, the determination that the price offered was fair was
reversed.9 1
The supreme court's conclusion that "the record does not establish that
this transaction satisfies any reasonable concept of fair dealing" 92 was based
on four factors surrounding the circumstances of the merger. The merger was:
(1) entirely initiated by Signal, (2) presented to and approved by UOP's board
under severe time constraints, (3) conducted without any serious negotiations,
and (4) based on wholly incomplete disclosure since the Signal feasibility
study was not discussed with the outside directors of UOP or disclosed to the
UOP stockholders. 93 The court's reasoning with regard to each of these con-
siderations is based on Signal's fiduciary duty and the corresponding responsi-
bility of the Signal-nominated directors to disclose "'all information in their
possession germane to the transaction in issue.'" 94
Although the record taken as a whole seems to support the court's conclu-
sion that the transaction does not meet the requirements of fair dealing, any
inference that each of the individual factors considered alone is sufficient to
constitute a violation of the fair dealing requirement is inappropriate. First,
every parent-subsidiary merger is, by definition, initiated by the parent corpo-
ration. Second, that the transaction is completed within a short time 95 is not
significant if all other elements of the transaction are deemed fair.96 Third,
88. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 711-12.
89. The Chancellor applied the Delaware block approach to valuation. This approach tradi-
tionally has been used in appraisal proceedings. Under the Delaware block approach, value is
determined using a weighted-average formula that considers market value, net asset value, and
investment or capitalized earnings value. After each of these elements of value is determined, the
Chancellor is required to assign a percentage weighting factor. The sum of each value times its
weighting factor is considered the appraisal value. For discussion of the Delaware block approach
and appraisal generally, see E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 372-97
(1972); Banks, Measuring the Value of Corporate Stock, 11 CAL. W.L. REv. 1 (1974); Lattin, Reme-
dies of Dissenting Sharehol der er A4pp raisal Statutes, 45 HARV. L. REv. 233 (1931); Lattin,
Minority and Dissenting Shareholders' Rights in Fundamental Changes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 307 (1958); Levy, Rights o rDissenting Shareholders to Appraisal andtPament, 15 CORNELLL.Q. 420 (1930); Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72YALE L.J. 223 (1962); Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L.R~v. 1453 (1966); Note, The Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy, 30 OKLA. L. RnV. 629
(1977).
90. Weinberger II1, 457 A.2d at 712-15.91. Id. at 714.
92. Id. at 712.
93. Id. at 711-12.94. I  t 0 (quoting Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.. 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977)).
95. The merger proposal was ratified and approved by UOP's board of directors four days
after the proposal was announced. The short period of time is unexplained because the proposalwas not resented to the stockholders until their next annual meeting on May 26, 1978, amost
three months after board approval. Id. at 706-707.
96. The length of time that a proposal is under consideration should not have any bearing onthe outcome of the case if the terms of the offer are fair. Although the short time allowed forconsideration of the transaction in this case is unexplained, all parties involved in the considera-tion of the offer were intimately familiar with UOP's business. See supra note 27.
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that negotiations in the sense of an offer and counteroffer were not conducted
is not surprising in a parent-subsidiary merger since the parent corporation's
offer is necessarily colored by the parent's awareness of its fiduciary duty.97
Finally, the feasibility study results are arguably of no consequence to the fair-
ness of the merger since the study concerned the benefits of the merger to
Signal, not UOP. 98
Two further observations regarding the majority stockholder's failure to
satisfy its fiduciary obligations must be noted. The court mistakenly implied
that the majority can satisfy its fiduciary duty by: establishing an artificial
independent negotiating structure,99 or by abstaining from any participation
in the transaction.°0 The fiduciary obligation of UOP's Signal-nominated di-
rectors, however, arose out of their relationship as directors of UOP 1'0 and
Signal's majority ownership, not out of the failure to establish an independent
bargaining group of outside directors or their participation in the negotiation
process. The most important element of the court's finding that the transac-
tion did not meet the fair-dealing standard, however, was the failure of Sig-
nal's UOP directors to notify the outside directors or UOP stockholders of the
results of their feasibility study.102 The court stated that, "with the well-estab-
lished Delaware law on the subject, and the Court of Chancery's findings of
fact here, it is inevitable that the obvious conflicts posed by Arledge and Chi-
tiea's preparation of their 'feasibility study,' derived from UOP information,
for the sole use and benefit of Signal, cannot pass muster."103 Thus, to the
extent that the court implied that "the result here could have been different if
UOP had appointed an independent negotiating committee of its outside di-
rectors to deal with Signal at arm's length,"'104 or abstained from participating
in the consideration of the matter,' 05 the court's analysis is internally inconsis-
tent and contrary to the settled law of the fiduciary obligations of majority
97. See supra note 26. The trial court rejected plaintiffs allegations that no negotiations had
taken place. In so doing, the Chancellor interpreted "negotiations" in very broad terms, rather
than focusing on price offers and counteroffers. See Weinberger II, 426 A.2d at 1351-52. Finally,
in light of the majority stockholder status of Signal, the Chancellor recognized that Signal "could
not start at a price below that which it truly felt to be the fair value of UOP's shares and bargain
upward." Id. at 1354. Since Signal wore two hats as the majority shareholder of UOP and the
acquiring company, "it had to take care that it did not propose to pay more than was fair and
reasonable for the UOP shares." Id. In light of Signal's dual fiduciary duty to its stockholders
and the minority stockholders of UOP, it is not surprising that the only negotiations involved non-
price considerations like employee stock ownership and incentive plans as well as the assurance of
future employment for UOP's key personnel.
98. Seesu pra note 23. If, as the Weinberger 111 opinion suggests, a shareholder's sole interest
is in the value of his shares and he is thus relegated to an appraisal remedy, see infra notes 115-122
and accompanying text, then the results of the report are arguably of no interest to the UOP
shareholders.
99. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 709-10 n.7.
100. Id. at 711.
101. See supra note 80.
102. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
103. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 711.
104. Id. at 709-10 n.7.




The second aspect of the entire fairness standard is the requirement of
fair price.'0 7 The court concluded that the appropriate approach to valuing
the minority shares was the same as that in an appraisal proceeding.' 08 As
such, the resolution of the fair price aspect of entire fairness is dependent on
the court's new liberalized appraisal techniques.10 9 Since the Chancellor re-
jected the plaintiffs evidence as not "correspond[ing] with either logic or the
existing law,"' 110 the court concluded that "there can be no finding at the pres-
ent stage of these proceedings that the price is fair."' 'I
In rejecting the Chancellor's determination that the price offered by Sig-
nal was fair, the court declared that the long-standing Delaware block ap-
proach to valuation was "clearly outmoded,"' 12 and "[ilt is time we recognize
this in appraisal and other stock valuation proceedings and bring our law cur-
rent on the subject." ' 13 Furthermore, the court, after reviewing the legislative
history of the appraisal statute and the application of the remedy to take out
mergers, concluded that "the provisions of 8 Del. C § 262, as herein construed,
respecting the scope of an appraisal and the means for perfecting the same,
shall govern the financial remedy available to minority stockholders in a cash-
out merger." 114 Because of inconsistencies in the court's enumeration of the
minority stockholder's remedy and the court's misinterpretation of the appro-
priate elements of value that can be considered in an appraisal award, the
application of the appraisal remedy to take out mergers and its relationship to
the entire fairness test is uncertain.
The most obvious inconsistency in the court's analysis of the remedy
available to minority stockholders are the statements that "[w]hile a plaintiffs
monetary remedy ordinarily should be confined to the more liberalized ap-
praisal proceeding herein established, we do not intend any limitation on the
historic powers of the Chancellor to grant such other relief as the facts of a
particular case may dictate,"' 15 and "we return to the well established princi-
ples of Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc. ... and David J Greene & Co. v.
Schenley Industries, Inc.,. . . mandating a stockholder's recourse to the basic
106. See Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 711, for discussion of fiduciary obligations.
107. Id. at 711-15.
108. Id. at 712-15.
109, Id. at 712-13. The court concluded that the Delaware block approach to valuation was
clearly outmoded, noting that the discounted cash flow valuation method adopted by plaintiffs
financial expert was precisely the type of analysis employed in the Arledge-Chitiea report. "We
believe that a more liberal approach must include proof of value by any techniques or methods
which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissible in
court .. " Id. at 713. This unexpected rejection of the long-standing Delaware block approach
appears to have been instigated by Justice Quillen. See supra note 83.
110. Weinberger 11, 426 A.2d at 1360.
111. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 714.
112. Id. at 712.
113. Id See supra note 109.
114. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 715.
115. Id. at 714.
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remedy of an appraisal." 1 6 Since the court's rejection of the business purpose
test implicitly accepts the proposition that a stockholder's interest and right is
exclusively the value of his investment 1 7 and the liberalized appraisal remedy
is intended to "fully compensate shareholders for whatever their loss may
be,"' "18 there is no justification for the exercise of any of the Chancellor's in-
herent equitable powers. Furthermore, to the extent that a stockholder's inter-
est is solely value, there is no justification for consideration of fair dealing in
determining what remedy to apply. 19 Thus, the only conceivable interprett-
tion of the opinion that gives effect to the fair dealing requirement is that the
majority's failure to demonstrate that it has met the test of fair dealing will
invoke the inherent equitable powers of the Chancellor.120 This result is con-
trary to the generally accepted interpretation of the Stauffer and David J.
Greene & Co. 121 opinions cited as support for the proposition that a stock-
holder's recourse is the basic remedy of an appraisal. 122
In addition to this apparent contradiction, the Weinberger analysis of the
elements of value that may be considered in an appraisal proceeding 123 is
flawed. Although the court rejected the exclusive monetary formula enumer-
ated in Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp. ,124 the court concluded that value, de-
termined by taking into account all relevant factors, "includes the elements of
rescissory damages if the Chancellor considers them susceptible of proof.' 2 5
The rescissory damages standard in Lynch, 12 6 however, clearly includes ele-
116. Id. at 715.
117. In adopting the business purpose test, the Singer court rejected defendants' contention
that a stockholder's right is exclusively in the value of his investment.
At the core of defendants' contention is the premise that a shareholder's right is
exclusively in the value of his investment, not itsform. And, they argue, that right is
protected by a § 262 appraisal which, by definition, results in fair value for the shares.
This argument assumes that the right to take is coextensive with the power to take and
that a dissenting stockholder has no legally protected right in his shares, his certificate or
his company beyond a right to be paid fair value when the majority is ready to do this.
Singer v. Magnovox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977-78 (1977). See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
This assumption regarding the nature of a stockholder's interest formed the theoretical foundation
for the business purpose test.
This implied rejection of the proposition that a stockholder has an interest in the form of his
investment is further supported by Weinberger's appraisal mandate. Since an appraisal proceed-
ing can only protect value, the Weinberger opinion ultimately rejects the stockholder's interest as a
stockholder.
118. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 714.
119. See supra notes 80-106 and accompanying text.
120. The Chancellor's inherent equitable powers include rescission and injunctive relief. The
court's opinion does not provide any guidance concerning when these nonmonetary remedies
might be invoked.
121. David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971).
122. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 715. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 12.
124. 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981).
125. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 714.
126. In Lynch the court stated that rescission was not feasible since the merger had been ac-
complished long before the ultimate decision of the Delaware Supreme Court. The court con-
cluded, however, that a monetary equivalent of rescission was the proper remedy. "[A fair result
without requiring recission] can be accomplished by ordering damages which are the monetary
equivalent of rescission and which will, in effect, equal the increment in value that Vickers en-
joyed as a result of acquiring and holding the TransOcean stock in issue." Lynch, 429 A.2d at 501.
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ments of value that arise "from the accomplishment or expectation of the
merger." 127
The Weinberger analysis obscures the underlying assumption of the ap-
praisal statute that a stockholder is "'entitled to be paid for that which has
been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going concern.' "128
By focusing on subtle changes in the wording of section 262,129 the court con-
cluded that "[o]nly the speculative elements of value that may arise from the
'accomplishment or expectation' of the merger are excluded."'130 If this con-
clusion is taken to its logical conclusion, however, the appraisal proceeding
would ensure that the real economic benefits commonly cited by the commen-
tators as the justification for mergers13 1 would be appropriated by the minority
stockholders. 132 Rather than take into account the "future prospects of the
merged corporation,"'133 the court's liberalized appraisal proceeding should
focus on the future prospects of the subsidiary corporation as a free-standing
going concern and attempt to ensure that the minority stockholders receive an
amount equal to their proportionate interest in this going concern. 134
The Delaware Supreme Court's analysis in Weinberger is marred by in-
ternal inconsistencies and by the failure to enunciate the assumptions underly-
ing its analysis. The court's disavowal of Singer's business purpose test is
based on the observation that the case law virtually interpreted the test's effect
out of existence. Given Singer's theoretical foundation, that a stockholder's
interest is not solely in the value of his shares, however, the rejection of the
business purpose test and the corresponding mandate that appraisal is a stock-
holder's exclusive remedy fundamentally alter the relationship between a
stockholder and the corporation. Such a conclusion is unwarranted in the ab-
sence of a thoughtful resolution of the public policies relating to mergers and
acquisitions and the unique factual situations in which these transactions can
arise.135 Because of the importance of the stability of the Delaware Supreme
Court's interpretation of Delaware corporate law, the Weinberger analysis and
127. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983). See supra note 12. The following simple exam-
ple illustrates this point. Corporation A, valued at $100 million, proposed to merge with corpora-
tion B, valued at $100 million. Corporation As financial advisors valued the hypothetical
corporation A and B at $300 million due to substantial economies of scale and other savings. If
the merger is later challenged and rescissory damages were awarded in the amount of $200 million
(the incremental value to corporation A), the minority stockholders of corporation B would clearly
be receiving value arising "from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger."
128. Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 713 (quoting Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch.
523, 526, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (1950)).
129. See id. at 713-14.
130. Id. at 713.
131. Numerous economic benefits have been cited by commentators as justification for merg-
ers. Some of the more commonly mentioned benefits include: (1) elimination of potential con-
fficts of interest between the parent and subsidiary corporation; (2) facilitation of long-term debt
financing; (3) tax benefits; (4) economies of scale; (5) improved mangement; and (6) prevention of
duplication of professional and other costs of services. See generally supra notes 2-4.
132. See supra note 127.
133. Weinberger II, 457 A.2d at 713 (quoting Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch.
523, 526, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (1950)).
134. See Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 713.
135. See supra note 3.
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the court's about-face on this issue are troublesome. Both the Delaware courts
and other state courts that are called upon to resolve this issue must scrutinize
the underlying policy implications of their decisions and explicitly state their
assumptions. This scrutiny will ensure a proper balance between the protec-
tion of stockholders' interests and the finality of corporate transactions.
GLENN CARSTEN CAMPBELL
Criminal Procedure-North Carolina's Capital Sentencing
Procedure: The Struggle for an Acceptable Jury
Instruction
No right is valued more highly than the right to life, and certainly no
right should be more closely guarded and jealously protected by our judicial
system. Capital punishment stands apart from other forms of criminal punish-
ment because it deprives the defendant of this precious right to life and be-
cause this deprivation is final and irrevocable. As the United States Supreme
Court said, "Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a
100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two."1 Consequently,
any proceeding that concludes with the imposition of the death penalty must
be scrutinized carefully. As an influential and important step in such a pro-
ceeding, the instruction of the sentencing authority2 must reflect the court's
commitment to protecting the defendant's right to life.
In the last year and a half the North Carolina Supreme Court has decided
several cases determining the appropriate jury instruction in capital sentencing
cases under North Carolina's capital sentencing statute, 15A-2000. 3 In State v.
Pinch4 and the cases following it5 the court approved an instruction to the jury
that it has a duty to recommend a sentence of death if it found: (1) that one or
more statutory aggravating circumstances existed; (2) that the aggravating cir-
1. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
2. In North Carolina the sentencing authority is the trial jury. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2000(a)(2) (1983).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a) (1983) provides for a separate sentencing proceeding to
determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. Section (b)
provides that in this proceeding the trial judge must instruct the jury to consider aggravating and
mitigating circumstances:
(b) Sentence Recommendation by the Jury.-Instructions determined by the trial judge
to be warranted by the evidence shall be given by the court in its charge to the jury prior
to its deliberation in determining sentence. In all cases in which the death penalty may
be authorized the judge shall include in his instructions to the jury that it must consider
any aggravating circumstance or circumstances or mitigating circumstance or circum-
stances from the lists provided in subsections (e) and (f) which may be supported by the
evidence, and shall furnish to the jury a written list of issues relating to such aggravating
or mitigating circumstance or circumstances.
After hearing the evidence, argument of counsel, and instructions of the court, the
jury shall deliberate and render a sentence recommendation to the court, based upon the
following matters:
(1) Whether any sufficient aggravating circumstance or circumstances as enumer-
ated in subsection (e) exist;
(2) Whether any sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances as enumerated
in subsection (f), which outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found,
exist; and
(3) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to
death or to imprisonment in the State's prison for life.
4. 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982).
5. State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308 (1983); State v. Williams, 305 N.C. 656,
292 S.E.2d 243, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982); State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 292 S.E.2d 264,
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982); State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 293 S.E.2d 569, cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 503 (1982).
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cumstances were substantial enough to warrant the death penalty; and (3) that
the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances be-
yond a reasonable doubt.6 Prior to Pinch the jury usually was instructed that
on making these three findings, it "may," but "need not," recommend a sen-
tence of death.7 Consequently, the instructions approved in Pinch represented
a substantial change because they forbid the jury to exercise any discretion
after finding these three elements. Defendant in Pinch contended that these
instructions "'prejudicially withdrew from the jury the final option.., to
recommend a life sentence notwithstanding its earlier findings.' ",8 Stating that
it implicitly had answered this contention in State v. Goodman,9 the court re-
jected defendant's argument.
In his dissent in Pinch and the four cases following it,10 Justice Exum
voiced his strong opposition to the majority's conclusion that under North
Carolina's capital sentencing statute a jury must return the death penalty after
making certain findings. First, Exum pointed out that section 15A-2000 does
not provide that a jury must return the death penalty,"I but simply ensures
that certain prerequisites are met before a sentence of death may be im-
posed. 12 Second, contending that the majority's interpretation of the statute
resulted from a fear of constitutional attack, Exum argued that the majority's
construction was not constitutionally required.' 3 Third, he contended that the
majority's holding was based on a misreading of Goodman.' 4
Justice Exum's arguments justify a careful scrutiny of the majority's con-
6. State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 184, 293 S.E.2d 569, 590, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 503 (1982);
Pinch, 306 N.C. at 32-33, 292 S.E.2d at 227; State v. Williams, 305 N.C. 656, 689-90, 292 S.E.2d
243, 263, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982); State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 707-09, 292 S.E.2d 264,
274-275, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982). The jury instructions given in State v. McDougall, 308
N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308 (1983), were slightly different in that the order of issues (2) and (3) were
reversed. Record at 119, McDougall.
The supreme court did not find prejudicial error in the McDougall instructions, but the court
did recommend a model charge, discussed infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
7. NORTH CAROLINA CONFERENCE OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES, NORTH CAROLINA PAT-
TERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CASES 150.10, at 4 (Replacement May 1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as N.C.P.I. CRIM.].
8. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 33, 292 S.E.2d at 227. Defendant argued that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2000 (1983) and the eighth and fourteenth amendments protect a defendant's right to trial by a
jury that has the option to recommend a life sentence notwithstanding its earlier findings. De-
fendant's Brief at 75.
9. 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979). In Goodman the court overruled an assignment of
error based on the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it could still recommend life impris-
onment even though it found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating. The
Pinch majority quoted the following language from Goodman: "'[lI]t would be improper to in-
struct the jury that they may, as defendant suggests, disregard the procedure outlined by the legis-
lature and impose the sanction of death at their own whim.'" Pinch, 306 N.C. at 34, 292 S.E.2d at
227 (quoting Goodman, 298 N.C. at 35, 257 S.E.2d at 590). Apparently, the Pinch court felt thatthis language implied that a jury should not be permitted to recommend life imprisonment if it
found the three elements set out in the procedure.
10. See supra note 5 (four cases decided after Pinch on issue of jury instructions). Justice
Exum dissented in all four cases for the same reasons that he dissented in Pinch.
11. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 38, 292 S.E.2d at 230 (Exum, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 46, 292 S.E.2d at 234 (Exum, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 38, 292 S.E.2d at 230 (Exum, J., dissenting). See infra notes 60-66 and accompany-
ing text.
14. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 45, 292 S.E.2d at 234 (Exum, J., dissenting).
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clusion. This examination is also compelled because the issue involved,
whether the jury should be instructed that it "must" or that it "may" recom-
mend death upon making certain findings, raises questions concerning the
protection of the defendant's right to life.
During the last decade the courts and the North Carolina legislature have
struggled to fashion an acceptable standard for capital sentencing instruction.
Any examination of the present controversy, therefore, must begin with the
legal history of both the capital sentencing statute and jury instructions. North
Carolina's present capital sentencing statute began with Furman v. Georgia,'5
in which the United States Supreme Court vacated the defendants' death
sentences in cases arising out of Texas and Georgia. In Furman the jury had
wide discretion in the imposition of the death penalty. This unbridled discre-
tion troubled the Court. "Central to the limited holding in Furman was the
conviction that the vesting of standardless sentencing power in the jury vio-
lated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."'16 In response to this holding,
the North Carolina legislature imposed a mandatory sentence of death for first
degree murder and first degree rape, 17 leaving the jury no idependent sen-
tencing discretion in such cases.
The North Carolina statute reached the United States Supreme Court in
Woodson v. North Carolina.18 The Supreme Court struck down the North
Carolina mandatory death penalty statute,19 and the state legislature drafted a
new statute substantially identical to the present capital sentencing statute.20
Since this statute was adopted in response to Woodson and its companion
cases, these cases offer insight into the legislative intent behind the statute.
In Woodson the Court held that North Carolina's mandatory death sen-
15. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Three cases were before the Supreme Court inFurman. In one case,
the death penalty was imposed for murder, and in the other two, it was imposed for rape. The
Supreme Court held that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 238. See generally Wollan, Death Penalty After Furman, 4 Loy. U. CHi. L.J.
339 (1974); Note, Is the Death Penalty Dead?, 26 BAYLOR L. RaV. 114 (1974); Note, Response to
Furman: Can Legislatures Breathe Life Back Into Death?, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 172 (1974).
16. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302 (1976).
17. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (amended 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
21 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (repealed 1979). Second degree murder was punishable by a term of im-
prisonment from two years to life, and second degree rape was punishable by life imprisonment or
a term of years determined by the court. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17, 14-21 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
18. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). The defendants in Woodson, whose convictions of first-degree mur-
der and whose death sentences under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (amended
1979) were upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court, challenged the constitutionality of the
mandatory death sentence statute. Woodson was decided along with four other cases: Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (1976); and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the controlling opinion.
19. The Supreme Court held that North Carolina's mandatory death sentence statute vio-
lated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280.
20. The statute enacted following Woodson was 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 406, § 2 (Ist Sess.)
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983)). With the exception of three minor
amendments, it was identical to the present N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000. One 1979 amendment
added subdivision (11) to subsection (e). 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 565, § 1 (1st Sess.). Near the
middle of subdivision (5) of subsection (e), a 1979 amendment inserted "or a sex offense," 1979
N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 652, § 1 (1st Sess.), and a 1981 amendment inserted "homicide," 1981 N.C.
Sess. Laws ch. 652, § 1 (lst Sess.).
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tence statute failed "to provide a constitutionally tolerable response to
Furman's rejection of unbridled jury discretion in the imposition of capital
sentences." 21 The Court expounded on this holding in Gregg v. Georgia,22
reading Furman as mandating "that where discretion is afforded a sentencing
body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life
should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and lim-
ited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." 23
With its adoption of section 15A-2000(b), the legislature provided for the di-
rection of jury discretion by requiring that the jury base its sentencing recom-
mendation on a balancing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
involved.24 Woodson also required that the sentencing authority consider "the
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense."25 The North Carolina statute meets this requirement by
listing statutory aggravating and mitigating factors that focus on the defendant
and the circumstances of his crime.26
The requirements specified in Gregg and Woodson stemmed from the
Supreme Court's concern that the death penalty should be imposed only when
the jury followed standardized guidelines. The Court said in Gregg:
Nothing in any of our cases suggests that the decision to afford an
individual mercy violates the Constitution. Furman held only that,
in order to minimize the risk that the death penalty would be im-
posed on a capriciously selected group of offenders, the decision to
impose it had to be guided by standards so that the sentencing au-
thority would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime
and the defendant.27
In Woodson the plurality opinion stated that because of the qualitative differ-
ence between death and life imprisonment, "there is a corresponding differ-
ence in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case." 28 Consequently, section 15A-
2000(c) requires three findings before a jury may recommend a sentence of
death.29 These three findings are nearly identical to those that trigger the
jury's duty to recommend the death penalty in the jury instructions approved
21. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302.
22. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
23. Id. at 189.
24. See supra note 3.
25. The Woodson court reasoned:
While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations generally
reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative, we believe that
in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender
and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of
the process of inflicting the penalty of death.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (citation omitted).
26. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2000(e) & (f) (1983) (listing of statutory aggravating and
mitigating circumstances).
27. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199.
28. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
29. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c) (1983).
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by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Pinch.30
The relevant history of the jury instructions began after the North Caro-
lina legislature's response to Woodson. Instruction 150.10 of the North Caro-
lina Pattern Jury Instructionsfor Criminal Cases31 was rewritten following the
enactment of section 15A-2000 in 1977. The June 1977 draft instructed the
jury that to recommend the death penalty, the state had to prove the three
elements set out in section 15A-2000(c): 32 (1) that one or more statutory ag-
gravating circumstances existed; (2) that they were sufficiently substantial to
call for the imposition of the death penalty; and (3) that the mitigating circum-
stances were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. If the
jury unanimously made these findings it was instructed that it "may" recom-
mend the death penalty.33 In 1979 the instructions were revised slightly, so
that the jury was instructed, "you may, although you need not, recommend
that the defendant be sentenced to death."'34 Thus, from 1977 until May 1980,
when the jury instructions were changed substantially, section 15A-2000 was
construed as requiring the jury to make the three findings before it could con-
sider recommending death. During this time, neither the courts nor the legis-
lature indicated that this construction was faulty or that the jury should be
required to recommend death upon making the three findings.
In 1980 the jury instructions were revised to impose a duty to recommend
a sentence of death if a jury makes these three findings.35 The footnote to
these instructions cited State v. Goodman as the basis for the change in the
wording from "may recommend" to "duty to recommend." 36 Apparently, the
(c) Findings in Support of Sentence of Death.-When the jury recommends a sen-
tence of death, the foreman of the jury shall sign a writing on behalff the jury which
writing shall show:
(1) The statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances which the jury finds
beyond a reasonable doubt; and
(2) That the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances found by the jury
are sufficiently substantial to call for imposition of the death penalty; and
(3) That the mitigating circumstance or circumstances are insufficient to outweigh
the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found.
30. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 32-33, 292 S.E.2d at 227. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
The only difference between the statute and the jury instructions is in the wording of the third
issue: the statute reads "that the mitigating circumstances are insufficient to outweigh the aggra-
vating circumstances," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-2000(c) (1983), while the instructions state "that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances." Pinch, 306 N.C. at 32-33, 292
S.E.2d at 222. Presumably, this variation in wording would not significantly affect the jury's
decision.
31. The North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions are prepared by a committee of ten trial
judges chaired by the Honorable Thomas W. Seay, Jr. This preparation is considered an ongoing
project with two functions: (1) preparation of new instructions in response to new statutes, cases,
and requests from members of the bench and bar;, and 2) revision of existing instructions in re-
sponse to changes in law or policy. N.C.P.I. CRIm., supra note 7, at preface (December 1982).
The instructions are intended to state the law applicable to a fact situation, and a trial judge is to
make adaptations if necessary. Id., at xix (Guide to the Use of This Book). The pattern jury
instructions do not indicate whether trial judges are required to use these pattern instructions.
32. See supra note 3.
33. N.C.P.I. C~iM., supra note 7, § 150.10, at 5 (June 1977).
34. Id., § 150-10, at 4 (Replacement, May 1979) (emphasis added).
35. Id., § 150.10, at 3-4 (Replacement, May 1980) (emphasis added).
36. The footnote gave the case name and cite, and referred to Goodman, 298 N.C. at 34-35,
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drafters of the instructions considered certain language in the Goodman opin-
ion as mandating this change.
In Goodman the trial court had used the "may recommend" instruction,37
but defendant contended that the court had erred in failing to instruct the jury
that it could recommend life imprisonment despite a finding that the aggravat-
ing circumstances outweighed the mitigating. Defendant argued that the jury
would balance mathematically the two factors and impose death whenever the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating. The supreme court re-
jected this argument because it felt that a jury would not decide such an im-
portant question so mathematically. "Nuances of character and circumstances
cannot be weighed in a precise mathematical formula. '38 More importantly,
the court feared that defendant's suggestion would lead the jury to believe that
it could disregard the statutory standards, thus jeopardizing the constitutional-
ity of the instructions:
[M]e believe that it would be improper to instruct the jury that they
may, as defendant suggests, disregard the procedure outlined by the
legislature and impose the sanction of death at their whim. To do so
would be to revert to a system pervaded by arbitrariness and caprice.
The exercise of such unbridled discretion by the jury under a court's
instruction would be contrary to the rules of Furman and the cases
which followed it.3 9
The drafters of pattern instruction 150.10 read this language as requiring a jury
to recommend death if it found the three elements set out by the legislature in
section 15A-2000(c). In State v. Pinch the North Carolina Supreme Court up-
held the 1980 change in the jury instructions, apparently unwilling to chal-
lenge the interpretation of Goodman adopted by the drafters of the pattern
instruction.
Pinch and its companion cases4° were appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. Although certiorari was denied, Justice Stevens wrote a
memorandum opinion in Smith v. North Carolina,41 questioning the constitu-
tionality of the jury instructions approved by the North Carolina Supreme
257 S.E.2d at 590 (discussion of jury instructions). See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
N.C.P.I. CraM., supra note 7, § 150.10, at 4 n.7 (Replacement, May 1980) (emphasis added).
37. The Goodman instructions were closest to the 1977 pattern jury instructions, since the
trial judge in Goodman told the jury that it "may recommend" death if it found the necessary
elements. Record at 185, Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569. But the trial judge switched
issues two and three, so the jury decided first whether the mitigating circumstances outweighed the
aggravating, and then whether the aggravating circumstances warranted death. Id. at 174. See
supra text accompanying notes 32-33. The order of these issues was probably insignificant, espe-
cially since the jury still had the discretion to recommend life or death after it answered all the
issues.
38. Goodman, 298 N.C. at 34-35, 257 S.E.2d at 590.
39. Id at 35, 257 S.E.2d at 590 (citation omitted).
40. State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691,292 S.E.2d 264 (1982); State v. Williams, 305 N.C. 656, 292
S.E.2d 243 (1982). All three cases were decided on September 4, 1982. Defendants in Smith and
Williams, like defendant in Pinch, assigned error to the trial court's jury instructions at the sen-
tencing phases. The instructions were substantially the same as those given in Pinch, and the
North Carolina Supreme Court, citing Pinch, upheld these instructions in both cases. Williams,
305 N.C. at 689-90, 292 S.E.2d at 262-63; Smith, 307 N.C. at 707-09, 292 S.E.2d at 275.
41. 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982) (mem.).
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Court in these three cases. "There is an ambiguity in these instructions that
may raise a serious question of compliance with this Court's holding inLockett
v. Ohio .... "42 Justice Stevens' reasons for disapproving of the instructions
were similar to those expressed by Justice Exum in his dissent in Pinch. Both
Justices believed a jury might answer issues two and three affirmatively, find-
ing that the aggravating circumstances warranted death and that they out-
weighed the mitigating circumstances, and yet still feel that death was not the
proper penalty.4 3 Quoting a Utah Supreme Court case that instructed the jury
to consider the totality of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, Justice
Stevens suggested that the North Carolina judiciary might "make slight
changes in the form of its instructions to avoid the ambiguity I have
identified." 44
In response to this memorandum decision, the North Carolina Supreme
Court in State v. McDougall45 suggested a change in the jury instructions, and
pattern instruction 150.10 was revised again to correspond with the sugges-
tions in McDougal.46 These new instructions, which remain valid, still pro-
42. Id at 474. Lockett held that, to meet constitutional requirements, "a death penalty stat-
ute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating circumstances." Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 610 (1978). Footnote one in Justice Stevens' opinion is a quotation from Lockett:
"There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority
should be used to impose death. But a statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital
cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that
the death penalty will be imposed in spite offactors which may callfor a less severepenaly.
When the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible
with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."
Smith v. North Carolina, 103 S. Ct. 474,474 n.1 (1982) (mem.) (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605).
43. The pertinent part of Justice Stevens' opinion is as follows:
Literally read, however, those instructions may lead the jury to believe that it is required
to make two entirely separate inquiries: First, do the aggravating circumstances, consid-
ered apart from the mitigating circumstances, warrant the imposition of the death pen-
alty? And second, do the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors? It
seems to me entirely possible that a jury might answer both of those questions affirma-
tively and yet feel that a comparison of the totality of the aggravating factors with the
totality of mitigating factors leaves it in doubt as to the proper penalty. But the death
penalty can be constitutionally imposed only if the procedure assures reliabilty in the
determination that "death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case."
Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 474-75 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 601).
Justice Exum said that:
Conscientious juries may determine that these issues ought to be answered affirmatively
and yet, because of circumstances of the case, "nuances," if you will, not subject to artic-
ulation in a statute or a verdict and not perhaps articulable by the jurors themselves, feel
impelled to recommend that the death penalty not be imposed.
Pinch, 306 N.C. at 45, 292 S.E.2d at 234 (Exum, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
44. Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 475. Pointing out that the Utah Supreme Court "takes a less rigid
approach to this issue," Justice Stevens quoted from State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83 (Utah 1982):
"After considering the totality of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, you
must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravation outweighs total
mitigation, and you must further be persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
imposition of the death penalty is justified and appropriate in the circumstances."
Smith, 103 S. Ct. at 475 (quoting Wood, 648 P.2d at 83).
45. 308 N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308 (1983).
46. Id at 32-34, 301 S.E.2d at 327-28. N.C.P.I. CriM., supra note 7, § 150.10, at 5, 36 (Re-
placement, April 1983).
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vide that the jury has a "duty" to recommend death if it answers the three
issues affirmatively, but the order and the form of the issues are different. Is-
sues two and three are reversed, so that the jury now decides whether the miti-
gating circumstances are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating before it
decides whether the aggravating circumstances are substantial enough to call
for a recommendation of death. The final issue now reads, "Do you find...
that the aggravating. . circumstances found by you. . . are sufficiently sub-
stantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty when considered with the
mitigating... circumstances found by you?" 47 Emphasizing this revision, the
new instuctions recommend that this final issue be accompanied by careful
instructions that the jury should consider all the circumstances before making
its decision. Although the jury still has a duty to recommend the death pen-
alty if it answers this final issue affirmatively, it may not respond to this issue
until it has compared the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the
totality of the mitigating circumstances.48 These new instructions satisfy Jus-
47. McDougall, 308 N.C. at 33, 301 S.E.2d at 327 (emphasis added). The complete instruc-
tions contain four issues, the second being whether the jury finds any mitigating circumstances.
This second issue is omitted in this discussion for the sake of convenience. Consequently, the
third and fourth issues of the complete instructions are the second and third issues for the pur-
poses of this discussion.
The order and form of the issues to be submitted to the jury should be substantially
as follows:
(1) Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one or
more of the following aggravating circumstances?
(2) Do you find from the evidence the existence of one or more of the following mitigat-
ing circumstances?
(3) Do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstance or circum-
stances you have found is, or are, insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circum-
stance or circumstances you have found?
(4) Do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance or circum-
stances found by you is, or are, sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of
the death penalty when considered with the mitigating circumstance or circum-
stances found by you?
McDougall, 308 N.C. at 32-33, 301 S.E.2d at 327.
The issues set out in pattern instruction 150.10 are virtually identical to those in McDougall.
N.C.P.I. CRIM., supra note 7, § 150.10, at 4-5 (Replacement, April 1983).
48. The instructions that should accompany the final issues are as follows:
"In deciding this issue, you are not to consider the aggravating circumstances stand-
ing alone. You must consider them in connection with any mitigating circumstances
found by you. After considering the totality of the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the imposition of the
death penalty is justified and appropriate in this case before you can answer the issue
'yes.' In so doing, you are not applying a mathematical formula. For example, three
circumstances of one kind do not automatically and of necessity outweigh one circum-
stance of another kind. The number of circumstances found is only one consideration in
determining which circumstances outweigh others. The jury may very properly empha-
size one circumstances more than another in a particular case. You must consider the
relative substantiality and persuasiveness of the existing aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances in making this determination. You, the jury, must determine how compel-
ling and persuasive the totality of the aggravating circumstances are when compared
with the totality of the mitigating circumstances found by you. After so doing, if you are
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances found by you are
sufficiently substantial to call for the death penalty, it would be your duty to answer the
issue 'yes.' If you are not so satisfied or have a reasonable doubt, it would be your duty
to answer the issue 'no."'
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tice Stevens' criticism since the jury considers the totality of the circumstances
before it has a duty to recommend death. Justice Stevens' criticism could have
also been satisfied by simply reverting to the pre-1980 instructions, which had
provided that the jury may, "on further deliberation," recommend death if it
answered the three issues affirmatively.4 9 These "further deliberations" had
allowed the jury to consider all circumstances before making a decision.
Although the new instructions substantially improve the 1980 instructions
approved in Pinch, the North Carolina Supreme Court has refused to find
reversible error in these older instructions. In State v. Kirkley 5° the trial court
had given the jury the older instructions, asking first whether the jury found
the aggravating circumstances substantial enough to impose the death penalty,
and then whether the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating.51
The court told the jury it had a duty to recommend death if it answered these
issues affirmatively. On appeal, the supreme court set out the correct form and
order for the issues, but did not find reversible error in the trial court's instruc-
tion. "Although the jury instructions given during the sentencing procedure
were not a model charge, they were free from prejudicial error."52 Conse-
quently, and despite Justice Stevens' frank criticism, the faulty instructions
approved in Pinch still plague North Carolina's judicial system.
Thus, the history of North Carolina's capital sentencing instruction
reveals that several changes and much ambiguity could have been avoided
had the instructions remained as they were in 1979, providing that the jury
may recommend death upon making the three findings.53 This observation
naturally raises the question why the drafters of pattern instruction 150.10 and
the North Carolina Supreme Court felt that the instructions should be
changed to provide that the jury must recommend death. Both sources cite
Goodman as the basis for this change.54 Perhaps Goodman reminded the
drafters and the supreme court that they should examine the constitutionality
of the jury instructions. In his dissent in Pinch, Justice Exum stated, "The
majority construes the statute in this way [in the jury instruction] on the sole
ground that otherwise the statute would be subject to the constitutional attack
that a jury could decide between life and death in its unbridled discretion."55
McDougall, 308 N.C. at 34, 301 S.E.2d at 327-28 (citations omitted).
Pattern instruction 150.10 is identical. N.C.P.I. CriM., supra note 7, § 150.10, at 36-37 (Re-
placement, April 1983).
49. The jury was instructed that "if, having answered [the three issues] 'yes,' you are, on
further deliberation, satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the only just punishment for the
defendant is the death penalty, then you may unanimously so recommend." N.C.P.I. CRiM., supra
note 7, § 150.10, at 4 (Replacement, May 1979) (emphasis added).
50. 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983).
51. Id at 216-17, 302 S.E.2d at 155-56.
52. Id at 217, 302 S.E.2d at 156. There are problems with the supreme court's refusal to find
reversible error in these older instructions. See infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
53. N.C.P.I. CriM., supra note 7, § 150.10, at 4 (Replacement, May 1979).
54. Goodman did not require this change in the instructions. See supra notes 37-39 and ac-
companying text.
55. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 38, 292 S.E.2d at 230 (Exum, J., dissenting). In Furman the United
States Supreme Court held that a statute allowing the jury unbridled discretion to sentence a
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Although the majority never specified that this was the reason for its interpre-
tation, it is the only reasonable explanation. The majority did quote Good-
man, saying that it would be improper to allow the jury to disregard the
statutory procedure and "'impose death at its whim . . . . The exercise of
such unbridled discretion by the jury under the court's instruction would be
contrary to the rules of Furman and the cases which have followed it.' -56
This language suggests that the majority in Pinch was concerned with the con-
stitutionality of the jury's discretion. But the majority's interpretation, that the
jury must be required to recommend death if it makes certain findings, is not
constitutionally required, as Justice Exum explained in his dissent.57
In Goodman the court stated that it would be unconstitutional to instruct
the jury that it could disregard the statutory guidelines and impose death at its
own discretion.58 The United States Supreme Court would most likely agree
with this statment, since "Furman held. . . that. . . the decision to impose
[death] had to be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority would
focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendent." 59
But neither Furman nor Gregg and its companion cases suggest that the death
penalty must be imposed when the jury makes certain findings within these
standards. As Justice Exum pointed out in his dissent,60 the Supreme Court in
Gregg rejected defendant's argument that the proceeding under which he was
convicted was faulty because certain discretionary decisions resulted in some
qualified defendants escaping the death penalty.61
[These decisions are ones] which may remove a defendant from con-
sideration as a candidate for the death penalty. Furman, in contrast,
dealt with the decision to impose the death penalty on a specified
individual. . . .Nothing in any of our cases suggests that the deci-
sion to afford an individual mercy violates the Constitution. Furman
held. . . that. . . the decision to impose [death] has to be guided by
standards .... 62
The Supreme Court wanted to ensure that certain standards guide the decision
to impose death. "The jury is not required to find any mitigating circum-
stances in order to make a recommendation of mercy. . . but it must find a
defendant to death was unconstitutional under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S 238 (1972).
56. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 34, 292 S.E.2d at 227 (quoting Goodman, 298 N.C. at 35, 257 S.E.2d at
590).
57. Id at 45-49, 292 S.E.2d at 234-36 (Exum, J., dissenting) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976)). See infra text accompanying notes 60-61.
58. Goodman, 298 N.C. at 35, 257 S.E.2d at 590.
59. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199.
60. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 47, 292 S.E.2d at 235 (Exum, J., dissenting).
61. Defendant argued that the arbitrariness condemned by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1982), continued to exist in the new sentencing procedures that Georgia had adopted in response
to Furman. He pointed out the discretion inherent in processing a murder case: the state prosecu-
tor chooses whom he wishes to prosecute for a capital offense; the jury may convict a defendant
charged with a capital offense with a lesser included offense; and a defendant sentenced to die may
have his sentence commuted by the governor. These factors may cause qualified defendants to
escape the death penalty. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198-99.
62. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199.
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statutory aggravating circumstance before recommending a sentence of
death."'63 It was this same concern that the North Carolina Supreme Court
voiced in Goodman when it refused an instruction that it feared would allow
the jury to "impose death at its whim." 64 The drafters of pattern instruction
150.10 and the North Carolina Supreme Court in Pinch misconstrued this con-
cern, by requiring that jury discretion be strictly limited not only in a decision
to impose death, but also in a decision to grant ife by imposing a sentence of
life imprisonment. Goodman and the United States Supreme Court cases do
not suggest that discretion must be so limited when the jury wishes to impose a
life sentence rather than death.65 They fail to suggest that this is even the
preferred view. 66
If the instructions that a jury must recommend death upon answering the
three issues affirmatively are not constitutionally required, the next question is
whether they are constitutional at all. 6 7 Justice Stevens in his memorandum
opinion denying certiorari for Pinch raised questions about their constitution-
ality under Lockett v. Ohio.68 Justice Stevens did not hold that the instruc-
tions are unconstitutional, but he did state that "the question whether the
instructions to the juries are consistent with Lockett remains open for consid-
63. Id at 197.
64. Goodman, 298 N.C. at 35, 257 S.E.2d at 590 (emphasis added).
65. As the United State Supreme Court pointed out in Woodson, "Because of [the] qualita-
tive difference [between death and life imprisonment], there is a corresponding difference in the
need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case." Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). the Supreme Court
stated, "we are satisfied that this qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for
a greater degree of reliability when the sentence is imposed." Id. at 604.
66. In Gregg the Court specifically rejected defendant's argument that "the requirements of
Furman are not met.. . because the jury has the power to decline to impose the death penalty
even if it finds one or more statutory aggravating circumstances." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203. The
Court pointed out that the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed every death sentence to assure that
it was proportional to other sentences for similar crimes. Id at. 203. The North Carolina statute
provides for a similar review of every death sentence by the North Carolina Supreme Court. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d) (1983). This review further confirms that the North Carolina
construction requiring the jury to recommend death upon making certain findings is not constitu-
tionally required:
Since the proportionality requirement on review is intended to prevent caprice in the
decision to inflict the [death] penalty, the isolated decision of the jury to gford mercy does
not render unconstitutional death sentences imposed on defendants who were sentenced
under a system that does not create a substantial risk of arbitrariness or caprice.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203 (emphasis added).
According to Gregg, then, the instruction that the jury must recommend death upon answer-
ing the three issues affirmatively is not constitutionally required, and an instruction that the jury
may recommend death would pass constitutional muster.
67. Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Pinch agree that the instructions approved
in Pinch would pass constitutional muster under the rationale of Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976). Pinch, 306 N.C. at 34 n.17, 292 S.E.2d at 227 n.17; id at 48, 292 S.E.2d at 236 (Exum, J.,
dissenting). In Jurek the United States Supreme Court examined a Texas statute requiring the
jury to recommend death if it answered three questions affirmatively. The Court held that the
death penalty was not mandatory, and thus subject to constitutional attack, since the Texas proce-
dure allowed for consideration of the mitigating factors. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272. Because the
North Carolina instructions approved in Pinch also allow for consideration of mitigating factors,
they are arguably constitutional under the rationale of Jurek.
68. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). See supra notes 42-43.
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eration in collateral proceedings."' 69 The current North Carolina jury instruc-
tions, revised to correct problems that Justice Stevens raised,70 almost
certainly would be held constitutional by the United States Supreme Court.71
But since the North Carolina Supreme Court has refused to find reversible
error in the Pinch instructions, 72 the constitutionality of these instructions is
still undetermined. As it stands today, a trial judge, apparently at his whim,
may decide whether to use the new instructions set out in McDougall, or the
older instructions approved in Pinch. Consequently, not all defendants in cap-
ital cases may be sentenced under the same instructions. Defendants sen-
tenced under the older instructions may be condemned to death by a jury that
has never been given the opportunity to consider the totality of the circum-
stances involved in the case.73 Juries may feel compelled to sentence such
defendants to death, despite doubting that such a sentence is appropriate.
These instructions do not ensure that death is an appropriate punishment, as
Lockett requires.74 Thus, while the constitutional rights of defendants sen-
tenced under the new instructions may be protected adequately, the constitu-
tional rights of those sentenced under the older instructions may not be.
Since North Carolina's capital sentencing jury instructions are largely the
result of responses to constitutional issues raised in Furman and Gregg and its
companion cases, it is instructive to examine how other states have responded
to these issues. A few state legislatures have drafted statutes requiring the
sentencing authority to impose the death penalty if it makes certain findings. 75
Most state legislatures, however, have not imposed such a requirement. Like
North Carolina General Statutes section 15A-2000(c), 76 the capital sentencing
statutes in most states merely ensure that the death penalty cannot be imposed
unless certain findings are made. The courts in these states have not construed
their statutes as the North Carolina Supreme Court has, to require the jury to
impose the death penalty if the statutory findings are made.
For example, in Burrows v. State77 the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled
69. Smith v. North Carolina, 103 S. Ct. 474, 475 (1982) (mem.).
70. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
71. The instructions accompanying the fourth issue of the current instructions, see supra note
48, are substantially identical to those suggested by Justice Stevens in his memorandum decision.
See supra note 44. These instructions require that the jury consider all of the circumstances before
responding to issue four, thus eliminating the possibility that death will be imposed despite the
jury's doubt that it is proper. This possibility led Justice Stevens to question the constitutionality
of the earlier instructions. See supra note 43.
72. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
75. The Texas statute requires a recommendation of death if certain findings are made. See
supra note 67 and accompanying text. The California and Montana statutes require the sentenc-
ing authority to impose a sentence of death if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigat-
ing, or if aggravating circumstances are found and the mitigating circumstances are insufficient to
call for leniency. See infra note 89. The North Carolina jury instructions approved in Pinch are
similar to these statutes except they additionally require the jury to find that the aggravating cir-
cumstances are sufficient to warrant death before it has a duty to recommend death. See supra
text accompanying note 6.
76. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
77. 640 P.2d 533 (Okla. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1250 (1983). The pertinent part of the
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on an issue similar to that raised in Goodman. 78 The Burrows jury was in-
structed first, that it could not impose death unless it found aggravating cir-
cumstances; second, that if it found aggravating circumstances it may consider
imposing the death penalty; and third, that it could not impose the death pen-
alty if it found that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating.
Defendant contended that the trial court should have added a fourth instruc-
tion stating that the jury could decline to impose the death penalty even if it
found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating.79 Ruling
as the North Carolina Supreme Court did in Goodman,80 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court did not find this fourth instruction necessary. But the
Oklahoma court specifically pointed out that this ruling did not mean that the
jury was required to impose the death penalty if it found that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating. "The fourth instruction was sub-
sumed in the second, since the jurors were told that they could, not that they
had to, impose the death sentence."81
The Missouri Supreme Court has declared explicitly that the jury is not
required to impose the death penalty if it makes the findings that the Missouri
statute requires for consideration of a sentence of death.82 In State v. Bolder
83
the Missouri court stated: 'The jury cannot impose death if it finds that the
mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, but that
situtation is the only one in which punishment is mandated. Under no cir-
cumstances is the jury obliged to impose death." 84 The court also approved
instructions explicitly telling the jury that it was not compelled to impose
death if it found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigat-
ing.85 These examples and others86 demonstrate that other jurisdictions have
Oklahoma capital sentencing statute provides, "[u]nless at least one of the statutory aggravating
circumstances enumerated in this act is so found or if it is found that any such aggravating circum-
stance is outweighed by the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances, the death penalty
shall not be imposed." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1982).
78. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
79. Burrows, 640 P.2d at 544.
80. Goodman, 298 N.C. at 34-35, 257 S.E.2d at 590.
81. Burrows, 640 P.2d at 544.
82. The pertinent part of the Missouri capital sentencing statute provides:
1. [T]he judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it
to consider:.
(4) Whether a sufficient aggravating circumstance or circumstances exist to warrant the
imposition of death or whether a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances ex-
ist which outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found to exist.
(5) Unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in this
section is so found, the death penalty shall not be imposed.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.012 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1983).
83. 635 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1982) (en bane), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 770 (1983).
84. Id at 683.
85. Id
86. The Louisiana capital punishment statute provides: "A sentence of death shall not be
imposed unless the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance exists and, after consideration of any mitigating circumstances, recommends that the
sentence of death be imposed." LA. CODE Cram. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (West Cum. Supp. 1983).
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not believed it constitutionally necessary to limit the jury's discretion when it
wishes to grant mercy, as North Carolina has done.
There seems, then, to be no compelling basis for the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision to construe section 15A-2000 as requiring the jury to
impose the death penalty if it answers the issues in subsection (c) affirmatively.
There is no indication in section 15A-2000, or in the Gregg v. Georgia or
Woodson v. North Carolina opinions, which prompted the statute,87 that the
North Carolina legislature intended this construction. Subsection (c) was writ-
ten in response to the United States Supreme Court's demand that the imposi-
tion of death, or the denial of the defendant's right to life, be reliably justified.
The three findings were meant to be a threshold, at which point the jury could
consider imposing death.8 8 Nowhere in Gregg or Woodson did the Supreme
Court suggest that a sentence of life imprisonment should not always be an
option, and nothing in the North Carolina statute suggests that the three find-
ings in subsection (c) should trigger a duty to recommend death. The United
States Supreme Court never implied, and the North Carolina legislature never
intended, that the jury should ever be required to recommend a sentence of
death. If the North Carolina legislature had intended that the statute be con-
strued to require the jury to recommend death upon making the findings in
subsection (c), it could have indicated this intention clearly in the statute, as
legislatures in other states have done.89 The legislature's intent is further con-
The Louisiana Supreme Court has found reversible error in instructions that the jury must recom-
mend death ifit finds one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Brogdon, 426 So. 2d 158 (La. 1983).
In Mississippi the capital sentencing statute provides that the jury may impose the death
penalty only after finding that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist, and finding insufficient
mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (Cum.
Supp. 1983). The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that "[if the state merely proves the exist-
ence of an aggravating circumstance, the jury is free to find it insufficient to warrant death and is
not required to automatically impose the death penalty." Coleman v. State, 378 So. 2d 640, 646
(Miss. 1979).
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits hold that jury instructions that fail to inform the jury of its
option to recommend a life sentence despite a finding that aggravating circumstances exist violate
the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 801-02 (1 1th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1798 (1983); Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 3495 (1982). The Georgia and the South Carolina Supreme Courts find revers-
ible error when instructions fail to inform the jury that it may grant mercy despite proof of aggra-
vating circumstances. See, e.g., Spivey v. Smith, 241 Ga. 477, 481, 246 S.E.2d 288, 291 (1978);
State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 585, 300 S.E.2d 63, 71 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1802 (1983).
The Virginia Supreme Court has said:
Code § 19.2-264.4C provides that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless the
Commonwealth proves one of the two aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt. The statute does not require that, upon such proof, the jury must impose the
extreme penalty but only that, absent such proof, it shall not do so.
Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 479, 248 S.E.2d 135, 150 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967
(1979).
87. See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
88. This is how the court construed subsection (c) before Pinch. The jury instructions read
that, upon making the three findings, the jury may, though it need not, recommend death.
N.C.P.I. CRiM., supra note 7, § 150.10, at 4 (Replacement, May 1979).
89. The capital sentencing statutes in both California and Montana provide that a sentence
of death shall be imposed if the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating, or are
not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The California statute provides that "the trier of
[Vol. 62
CAPITA4L SENTENCING
firmed by ModelPenal Code section 210.6, on which the legislature drew heav-
ily in drafting the North Carolina statute.90 This section provides that the
death sentence shall not be imposed unless the sentencing authority finds that
an aggravating circumstance exists and that no mitigating circumstance is suf-
ficiently substantial to call for leniency.9 1 The Model Code does not suggest
anywhere that the death sentence must be imposed upon these findings.
Although there is no basis for the North Carolina Supreme Court's con-
struction of section 15A-2000, the most important question is not why the
Court construes the statute as it does, but, rather, what implications this con-
struction has for a defendant convicted of a capital felony. Does this construc-
tion affect the outcome of the sentencing phase of the trial, and, more
importantly, does it adequately protect a defendant's right to life?
The North Carolina capital sentencing statute is unique in the findings it
requires before the jury can recommend death. Most capital sentencing stat-
utes require only a showing that the aggravating circumstances exist or that
they are sufficient to outweigh the mitigating circumstances.92 But the North
Carolina statute is more lenient toward the defendant in this respect, permit-
ting the jury to impose the death sentence only if it concludes that aggravating
circumstances exist which outweigh the mitigating and that the aggravating
circumstances are sufficiently substantial to warrant death. 93 Consequently,
even under the North Carolina Supreme Court's statutory construction, the
jury is not required to impose the death penalty if it finds that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating. The jury is always free to grant mercy
through a finding that the aggravating circumstances are not sufficiently sub-
stantial to warrant death. Nevertheless, even if a North Carolina jury finds
that the aggravating circumstances do not warrant death, the instruction im-
fact shall consider, take into account and be guided by the mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances referred to in this section, and shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact concludes
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.3 (West Supp. 1983) (emphasis added). The Montana statute provides that the court "shall
impose a sentence of death if it finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances and finds that
there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency." MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-305 (1981) (emphasis added).
90. For a discussion of the legislature's reliance on the Model Penal Code, see State v. John-
son, 298 N.C. 47, 60-63, 257 S.E.2d 597, 608-10 (1979). The drafting of the Model Penal Code of
the American Law Institute began in 1952 with a grant from the Rockefeller foundation. The
Proposed Official Draft was completed in 1962. As of 1980,34 states had drawn upon this draft in
the codification or revision of their substantive criminal law. MODEL PENAL CODE forward (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962). Most states have adopted death penalty statutes that draw upon or
resemble MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 note on impact of Model
Code (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
91. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
92. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.012
(Vernon Cum. Supp. 1983); LA. CODE CRIM PRO. ANN. art. 905.3 (West Cum. Supp. 1983): Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (CuM. Supp. 1983). The Georgia statutue provides that "unless at least
one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (b) of this Code section
is found, the death penalty shall not be imposed." GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1981). In South
Carolina a jury recommending death "shall designate in writing. . . the aggravating circum-
stance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt." S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
20(C)(b)(9) (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1983).
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c)(2) (1983).
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posing a duty on the jury to recommend death if it answers certain issues af-
firmatively may still affect jury deliberations and even the outcome of the
sentencing phase of the trial. The extent to which the deliberations are affected
depends on whether the issues are those approved in Pinch,94 or those set out
in McDougall, which followed Justice Stevens' memorandum decision.9"
The instructions approved in Pinch required the jury to determine first
whether the aggravating circumstances warranted death, and then whether the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating. If the jury answered
both of these questions affirmatively, it was required to recommend death. It
is possible, however, that a jury could answer both questions affirmatively and
still feel that death was not warranted. The jury considers the aggravating
circumstances by themselves, and then, separately, whether the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating. After these considerations a sentence
of death or life imprisonment is required. The jury has no discretion to con-
sider the totality of the case before deciding whether death is warranted. The
case may arise when the jury feels that although the mitigating circumstances
do not outweigh the aggravating, they are still substantial enough to warrant a
grant of mercy.96 In fact, as Justice Exum pointed out in his dissent in
Pinch,97 juries in two different cases have answered all the issues affirmatively
and yet, in apparent disregard of the requirement in the instructions, have
recommended life imprisonment.98 These two cases illustrate the effect ofjury
instructions on a jury's sentencing decision. It is entirely possible that a jury
could feel as the juries in these two cases did, and yet, because of the "duty"
imposed by the instructions, not feel that it had an option to recommend life.
Whether jury instructions that conceivably could lead to such a result ad-
equately protect the defendant's right to life is questionable. And, as Justice
Stevens pointed out in his memorandum decision, the constitutionality of such
instructions is also questionable. Lockett requires that the sentencing proce-
dure ensure the reliability of a determination that death is appropriate.99 Be-
cause a jury, after considering the statutory issues, may feel forced to impose
death despite its desire to bestow mercy, it is questionable whether this relia-
bility is ensured.
The revised instructions set out in McDougall still impose a duty on the
jury to recommend death if it answers the issues affirmatively. Because of the
revised order and form of the issues, however, these instructions allow the jury
94. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
96. The Nebraska legislature even anticipated such a case by providing that the capital sen-
tencing authority must consider whether the mitigating circumstances "approach or exceed the
weight given to the aggravating circumstances." NEn. Rav. STAT. § 29-2522(2) (1979) (emphasis
added).
97. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 45 n.4, 292 S.E.2d at 234 n.4 (Exum, J., dissenting).
98. See State v. King, 301 N.C. 186, 270 S.E.2d 98 (1980); State v. Taylor, 298 N.C. 405, 259
S.E.2d 502 (1979). The North Carolina Supreme Court later noted that, "[w]hile this was error, it
was error favorable to the defendant from which the State could not appeal." State v. Williams,
305 N.C. 656, 689, 292 S.E.2d 243, 263 (1982).
99. Lockett, 103 S. Ct. at 475.
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more discretion to consider the totality of the case before a recommendation is
required. The final issue that the jury is to consider is whether the aggravating
circumstances, when considered with the mitigating circumstances, are suffi-
ciently substantial to call for death.10° This issue is to be accompanied by
careful instructions which, if properly given, instruct the jury to consider all
the circumstances, aggravating and mitigating, and then decide whether the
death penalty is justified.10 '
These revised instructions dispense with the constitutional problems that
plague the Pinch instructions. Since the jury considers the totality of the cir-
cumstances involved in the case, and then decides whether death is appropri-
ate, the Lockett reliability test presumably is satisfied.' 0 2 The new instructions
also better protect the defendant's right to life since they allow the jury more
discretion to grant mercy if it so desires. Presumably, a jury could not con-
sider all the circumstances and decide death was warranted, thus answering
the final issue affirmatively, and then still feel that it should return a sentence
of life. The final issue considered by the jury provides for a consideration of
all circumstances and gives the jury the ultimate discretion to impose the death
penalty. In effect, then, these new instructions may be viewed as similar to the
pre-Goodman instructions providing that the jury may return a sentence of
death upon answering the issues affirmatively. 10 3 Both sets of instructions al-
low the jury consideration of all circumstances"° 4 and, at some point, ultimate
discretion to return or refuse to return a sentence of death.10 5 Perhaps these
new instructions reflect an attempt by the North Carolina Supreme Court and
the drafters of pattern instruction 150.10 to return to the jury the discretion to
grant mercy allowed in the pre-Goodman instructions, but denied in the in-
structions approved in Pinch.
If these new instructions are a substantial improvement over those ap-
proved in Pinch, and if they are an attempt to return to the jury more discre-
tion to grant mercy, why did Justice Exum dissent in McDougall,106 in which
the new instructions were used? There are several possible explanations. Jus-
tice Exum finds it bothersome that the jury should ever have a duty to impose
the death penalty, no matter how it responds to the issues.10 7 Arguably, the
word "duty" may have slight psychological effects on some jurors. But since
the final issue allows the jury consideration of all circumstances plus the ulti-
100. See supra note 47.
101. See supra note 48. "After considering the totality of the aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the imposition of the death
penalty is justified and appropriate in this case before you can answer the issue 'yes."'
102. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
105. The new instructions allow this discretion in the jury's consideration of the final issue,
while the pre-Goodman instructions allowed this discretion after the issues had been answered, by
instructing the jury that it may, not must, recommend death.
106. State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 45, 301 S.E.2d 308, 334 (1983) (Exum, J., dissenting).
107. "I continue to think that a jury never has a duty to reccommend death no matter how it
answers the issues. It may not recommend death unless it answers the issues in a certain way."
Id.
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mate discretion to decide between life and death, imposing a duty on the jury
to recommend death if it answers this final issue affirmatively is practically
irrelevant. No alert jury could answer this issue affirmatively and still wish to
recommend a grant of mercy.
Justice Exum may also have maintained his dissent because he saw no
justifiable basis for the original change in the jury instructions, from "may
recommend" to "duty to recommend." Exum's dissent in Pinch concentrated
mainly on demonstrating that neither the statute, the Goodman holding, nor
the United States Supreme Court cases had required this change.108 Perhaps
because there was no justifiable basis for this change, Justice Exum probably
will not be satisfied until the North Carolina Supreme Court returns to the
pre-Goodman instructions.
Another possible explanation for Exum's continuing dissent is the refusal
of the North Carolina Supreme Court to find reversible error in the pre-Mc-
Dougall instructions.'0 9 In State v. Kirkley the supreme court did not find
reversible error in these older instructions, although the court admitted they
were not a "model charge."' "0 Exum maintained his dissent in Kirkley, "for
the same reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in McDougall.""' Even in
McDougall, in which the new instructions were stated, the supreme court re-
fused to find prejudicial error in the trial court's use of the Pinch instructions.
For this reason, Justice Exum's continuing dissent is entirely justified. As long
as these older instructions plague the North Carolina judicial system, the
state's protection of the defendant's right to life is questionable. The North
Carolina Supreme Court has criticized juries that have granted mercy in spite
of their duty to recommend death under the older instructions.' 12 Such criti-
cism hardly protects the defendant's right to life. It even discourages the jury's
attempt to provide such protection. As long as a defendant may be sentenced
under the older instructions, the North Carolina judicial system will risk con-
demning men and women to death without adequately protecting their right to
live.
With the new jury instructions set out in McDougall, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has returned to the jury a great deal of discretion to grant
mercy. These instructions ensure that a defendant will not be condemned to
death unless the jury is certain that such a severe penalty is justified. With such
assurance, the instructions adequately protect the defendant's right to life. But
a defendant convicted of a capital crime cannot be certain that he will be sen-
tenced under these new instructions. The North Carolina Supreme Court has
refused to find reversible error in the constitutionally suspect older instruc-
tions. Under these instructions, a defendant may be comdemned to death
even when the jury doubts that this extreme penalty is justified. Thus, a de-
108. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 38-49, 292 S.E.2d at 230-36 (Exum, J., dissenting).
109. N.C.P.I. CRIM., supra note 7, § 150.10, at 3-4 (Replacement, May 1980).
110. State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 217, 302 S.E.2d 144, 156 (1983).
111. Id. at 231, 302 S.E.2d at 164 (Exum, J., dissenting).
112. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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fendant sentenced to death under the older instructions has no guarantee that
the jury was certain that death was the appropriate penalty. Until these older
instructions are swept from the North Carolina judicial system, a defendant
convicted of a capital crime may find his right to life unjustly threatened.
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